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Defendant-sided unjust factors

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  02 January 2018

Duncan Sheehan
Duncan Sheehan*
Affiliation:
University of Leeds
*
Duncan Sheehan, Professor of Business Law, School of Law, University of Leeds, Leeds LS2 9JT, UK. Email: [email protected]
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Abstract

This paper will examine the structure of the defendant-sided unjust factors, by which I mean duress and undue influence. The paper first argues that undue influence is based on abuse of deferential trust placed in the defendant and duress on an illegitimate threat leading to the claimant's lack of consent. The paper distinguishes undue influence from the unconscionable bargains doctrine. The paper then models the effect of that on the claimant's intentional agency by reference to Michael Bratman's influential theory of intention. It suggests that while mistake can be modelled by way of the failure of a condition on his intention, meaning that the claimant's intention does not cover the facts as they actually turn out to be, defendant-sided factors are based on the defendant's having improperly inveigled himself into the claimant's practical reasoning. It suggests that this happens either by way of the defendant's illegitimate structuring of the claimant's choice or by way of the claimant's deferring his judgment to that of the defendant. The claimant's intentions have, in philosophical language, agential authority, but the claimant was ‘in the grip of a norm’; the essay explores what this concept might be.

Type
Research Article
Information
Legal Studies , Volume 36 , Issue 3 , September 2016 , pp. 415 - 437
Copyright
Copyright © Society of Legal Scholars 2016

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Footnotes

*

Earlier versions of this paper were given at the Restitution section of the SLS Conference at Nottingham University on 11 September 2014, and at a seminar at the University of Leeds Centre for Business Law & Practice on 26 January 2015. Many thanks to Gareth Spark and Pinar Akman for their comments as well.

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151. (1887) 36 Ch D 145 (CA) 170.

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163. [1997] 4 All ER 144.

164. Pallikkathayil, above n 131, at 18.

165. See Sheehan, above n 2, at 164–167. In failure of consideration cases it is because of the failure of a condition to the parties’ joint or collective intention: ibid, at 175–178.

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