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Published online by Cambridge University Press: 21 June 2018
Champions of constitutions and bills of rights regularly portray them as possessing significant, sometimes mysterious, powers. One characterisation is that newly implemented constitutions may invigorate a democracy, particularly at the ballot box. This paper challenges that notion by scrutinising a relatively unexplored area of constitutional performance: voter turnout. In particular, it examines a number of jurisdictions that have recently implemented constitutions and bill of rights, finding that in many of them, voter turnout decreased after passage, sometimes significantly. As the argument for a codified British constitution endures, the findings of this paper provide provisional evidence that those advocating for such a device should be wary of touting its potentially invigorating democratic effects. Ultimately, however, the paper calls for more research into the area of constitutions and democratic performance, such as voter turnout.
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83 ‘France backs constitution reform’ BBC News (21 July 2008), at http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/europe/7517505.stm (last accessed 28 May 2018).
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88 Scottish Government The Scottish Independence Bill: A Consultation on an Interim Constitution for Scotland (June 2014).
89 L Colley ‘Why Britain needs a written constitution’ The Guardian (4 November 2011), at https://www.theguardian.com/books/2011/nov/04/why-britain-needs-written-constitution (last accessed 28 May 2018).
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93 G Witte ‘After 800 years, Britain finally asks: do we need a written constitution?’ Washington Post (7 June 2015) at http://wpo.st/5oEq1 (last accessed 28 May 2018).
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100 Constitute Project, at https://www.constituteproject.org/ (last accessed 28 May 2018).
101 Although it is acknowledged that some of the examples outside of the main case studies below have come from countries making a fundamental political transition.
102 There were two cases (Montenegro and Venezuela) where after constitutional implementation, voting in the same election produced offsetting results, by increasing in parliamentary turnout but decreasing in presidential turnout, or vice versa. These countries were also excluded from the analysis, as the data cancels each other out.
103 There may be a strong argument that one should look at the long-term effects of new constitutions and their effects on voting participation. While I do hope to eventually take this into consideration, a project of such magnitude is outside the scope of this paper.
104 Gray and Cual, above n 72.
105 IDEA Voter Turnout Database ‘France’ at http://www.idea.int/data-tools/country-view/86/40 (last accessed 28 May 2018).
106 IDEA Voter Turnout Database ‘New Zealand’ at http://www.idea.int/data-tools/country-view/234/40 (last accessed 28 May 2018).
107 A New Magna Carta, above n 1.
108 Constitution Act 1986, Public Act No 114 (13 December 1986). Crucially, this Act does not contain a ‘we the people’ clause, as many contemporary constitutions do. However, it does articulate the structure of the state and further citizen understanding of their government.
109 Some refer to these documents as ‘super-statutes’.
110 IDEA Voter Turnout database ‘Colombia’ at http://www.idea.int/data-tools/country-view/82/40 (last accessed 28 May 2018).
111 Ibid.
112 IDEA Voter Turnout database ‘Spain’ at http://www.idea.int/data-tools/country-view/103/40 (last accessed 28 May 2018).
113 Ibid.
114 Data available upon request. This number includes New Zealand, which passed a statutory constitutional document (Constitution Act 1986), but does not include the UK, which passed only a statutory bill of rights (Human Rights Act 1998).
115 IDEA Voter Turnout database ‘Denmark’ at https://www.idea.int/data-tools/country-view/94/40 (last accessed 28 May 2018).
116 IDEA Voter Turnout database ‘Tunisia’ at https://www.idea.int/data-tools/country-view/284/40 (last accessed 28 May 2018).
117 IDEA Voter Turnout database ‘Central African Republic’ at https://www.idea.int/data-tools/country-view/75/40 (last accessed 28 May 2018).
118 IDEA Voter Turnout database ‘Senegal’, https://www.idea.int/data-tools/country-view/269/40 (last accessed 28 May 2018).
119 IDEA Voter Turnout database ‘United Kingdom’ at http://www.idea.int/data-tools/country-view/137/40 (last accessed 28 May 2018). It is acknowledged that in the 2017 general election, voting turnout did climb back to 68.7%, although this remains below pre-HRA levels.
120 UK Parliament ‘Rights Brought Home: The Human Rights Bill’ (CM3782, October 1997).
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129 New Zealand Bill of Rights Act 1990, Public Act No 109 (28 August 1990).
130 This is found in the Czech Republic Constitution at Art 3 (‘The Charter of Fundamental Rights and Basic Freedoms forms part of the constitutional order of the Czech Republic’). Conversely, the Charter is also found in the Slovak Republic Constitution, but was directly implemented into the document in Arts 5–54.
131 Czech Republic/Slovakia IDEA Voter Turnout database, http://www.idea.int/data-tools/country-view/91/40 (last accessed 28 May 2018), http://www.idea.int/data-tools/country-view/266/40 (last accessed 28 May 2018), respectively. The 1990 and 1992 voting turnout figures are the same for both the Czech and Slovak Republic, as they were still joined as a Federal Republic at the time. Before 1990 there is no voting turnout data for either country.
132 France IDEA Voter Turnout database, above n 105. In the 2017 election, French voter turnout in relation to Parliament dipped to 42.64%.
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139 T Kahana ‘Canada’ in Oliver and Fusaro, above n 133, p 11.
140 Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms, Part I of the Constitution Act 1982.
141 Canada Act 1982 (c 11).
142 Kahana, above n 139, p 26.
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148 Ibid, p 23.
149 In the 2017 snap election turnout did climb back to 68.7%, the highest since 1997 (see BBC Election 2017 Results at http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/election/2017/results (last accessed 28 May 2018).
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