Hostname: page-component-586b7cd67f-t7fkt Total loading time: 0 Render date: 2024-11-27T20:50:35.398Z Has data issue: false hasContentIssue false
  • English
  • Français

The challenge of artificial intelligence: can Roman law help us discover whether law is a system of rules?

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  02 January 2018

Geoffrey Samuel
Geoffrey Samuel*
Affiliation:
Lancaster University
Get access Rights & Permissions [Opens in a new window]

Extract

It may or may not be possible to develop an Artificial Intelligence model of legal reasoning that accurately reflects the processes of the legal mind, but one positive result that could well emerge from all the research into such modelling is a fundamental reassessment of legal theory. The paradigm that legal reasoning is essentially a rule based activity may well have to be discarded in favour of an epistemological model that is very much more complex, in the systems sense of this term, than the hierarchical structure traditionally associated with jurists since the Enlightenment (if not since the Byzantines) and represented in one of its most perfect theoretical forms today in Kelsen's model. It is the purpose of this paper to examine, if only briefly, this challenge to conventional legal theory (Part I) and, using systems theory, historical jurisprudence and Justinian's Digest (Part II), to suggest an alternative epistemological model (Part III).

Type
Research Article
Information
Legal Studies , Volume 11 , Issue 1 , March 1991 , pp. 24 - 46
Copyright
Copyright © Society of Legal Scholars 1991

Access options

Get access to the full version of this content by using one of the access options below. (Log in options will check for institutional or personal access. Content may require purchase if you do not have access.)

References

1. Chambliss, , ‘Models of Sociological Enquiry’ extracted in Lloyd & Freeman, Introduction to jurisprudence (Stevens, 5th edn, 1985), p 615 Google Scholar.

2. Ibid, p 616.

3. For an excellent recent discussion see Bergel, , Théorie giénérale du droit (Dalloz, 2e édn, 1989) pp 261–286 Google Scholar.

4. Oléron, , L'argumentation (PUF, 2e édn, 1987) pp 36–45 Google Scholar. For the role of the syllogism in French law see, Schroeder, , Le nouueau stylc judiciaire (Dalloz, 1978) pp 71–124 Google Scholar.

5. On which see Bell, , Policy Arguments in Judicial Decisions (Oxford, 1983)Google Scholar.

6. Bertrand, Le rôle de la dialectique en droit privé positif D1951.1151, quoted in Bergel, op cit, p272.

7. Perelman, , Logique juridique: Nouuelle rhétorique (Dalloz, 2e édn, 1979)Google Scholar.

8. See Susskind, , Expert System in Law (Oxford 1987)Google Scholar.

9. Susskind, , supra, p 44 Google Scholar.

10. Atias, , Epistémologic juridique (PUF, 1985), pp 12ffGoogle Scholar.

11. Lloyd, & Freeman, , op cit, p 7 Google Scholar.

12. Atias, , op cit., p 12 Google Scholar.

13. David, , ‘Sources of Law. International Encyclopedia of Comparatiue Law, Vol 11 Google Scholar, Chapter 3, para 391.

14. Susskind, , op cit, p 154 Google Scholar.

15. Stromholm, , A Short History of Legal Thinking in the West (Norstedts, 1985), p 67 Google Scholar.

16. Jones, , Historical Introduction to the Theory of Law (Oxford, 1940) p vii (Preface)Google Scholar.

17. On which see Van Caenegem, , The Birth of the English Common Law (Cambridge, 2nd edn, 1988), pp 85–110 CrossRefGoogle Scholar; Judges, Legislators and Professors (Cambridge, 1987).

18. On all of these points see generally Van Caenegern, ‘History of European Civil Procedure’, International Encyclopedia of Comparative Law, Vol XVI Google Scholar, Chap 2, para 26.

19. Birks, & McLeod, , Justinian's Institutes (Duckworth, 1987) pp 23–26 Google Scholar.

20. Villey, , La formation de la pensée juridique moderne (Montchrestien, 4e édn, 1975) pp 700–701 Google Scholar.

21. Villey sees common lawyers as being uncorrupted by the Humanist movement which preceded that of the Natural Lawyers: Villey, supra, p 700.

22. Hofstadter, , Gödel, Escher, Bach (Penguin, 1980) p 67 Google Scholar.

23. Ibid, p 71.

24. But cf Van Caenegem, Civil Procedure, op cit, para 26.

25. Blanché, , L'épistémologie (PUF, 3rd edn, 1983) pp 36–39 Google Scholar.

26. Ibid, p 38.

27. Dworkin, , Law's Empire (Fontana, 1986) p 14 Google Scholar.

28. Hofstadter, , op cit, p97 Google Scholar.

29. Bergel, , op cit, pp 4–5 Google Scholar.

30. Blanché, , op cit, p 120 Google Scholar.

31. Ibid, p 121.

32. Atias, , op cit, pp 64–65Google Scholar.

33. Dworkin, , Taking Rights Seriously (Duckworth, 1977) p 24 Google ScholarPubMed.

34. Ibid, p 26.

35. Atiyah, , ‘Form and Substance in Legal Reasoning’, in MacCormick, & Birks, (eds) The Legal Mind: Essays for Tony Honori (Oxford, 1986) pp 19ffGoogle Scholar.

36. By ‘phenomenon of law’ is meant ‘everything that contributes to the birth of legal norms’: Atias, , op cit, p 93 Google Scholar.

37. See generally Raz, , ‘The Problem About the Nature of Law’, in Lloyd, & Freeman, , op cit., at pp 476–479 Google Scholar.

38. See eg, Honoré, , Making Law Bind (Oxford, 1987) pp 32–51 Google Scholar.

39. Bergel, , ‘Difference de nature égale difference de régime’ [1984] Revue trimestrielle de droit civil 255 Google Scholar.

40. See eg, Samuel (1983) 99 LQR 182.

41. Cf Susskind, , op cit, pp 164–169 Google Scholar.

42. Bergel, , Théorie générale, op cit, p 275 Google Scholar.

43. A-G v Guardian Newspapers Ltd (No 2) [1988] 3 WLR 776 at 810, HL.

44. Stoke-on-Trent City Council v W & J Wass Ltd [1988] 1 WLR 1406.

45. Dworkin, , Taking Rights Seriously, op cit, pp 26 Google Scholarff.

46. Stein, & Shand, , Legal Values in Western Society (Edinburgh, 1974) pp 97–103 Google Scholar.

47. See generally Taking Rights Seriously, op cit, pp 34ff.

48. Samuel, 'Le Droit Subjectif and English Law [1987] CLJ 264. For a recent discussion from the political viewpoint see Marquand, ‘Subversive Language of Citizenship’, The Guardian 2 January 1989, p 15.

49. Carlill v Carbolic Smoke Ball Co [1893] 1 QB 256.

50. See eg, Immigration (Carriers' Liability) Act 1987, s 1.

51. French Civil Code art 1134.

52. Printing and Numerical Registering Co v Sampson (1875) LR 19 Eq 462 at 465.

53. See French Civil Code art 544.

54. Digest 50.17.1 & 202 (Digest herein after cited D; Roman law references can now be researched both in Latin and in English in Mommsen, Krueger & Watson, , The Digest of Jurtinian, Pennsylvania, 1985, 4 vols)Google Scholar; Villey, op cit, pp 526-530.

55. Stein & Shand, op cit, pp 103-106.

56. The Roman jurists used the notion of ius, here meaning ‘connection’ (D1. 1.12), to describe law at the level of the individual subject. Today ius is often translated by the word ‘right’ but its meaning in Roman times probably meant an objective legal bond between person-and-person (iuris vinculum: J.3. 13pr) and person-and-thing. See generally Villey, op cit, pp 230-239; Stein & Shand, op cit., p 114ff; and Tuck, Natural Rights Theories (Cambridge, 1979).

57. Carbonnier, , Flexible droit (LGDJ, 5e édn, 1983) pp 145–152 Google Scholar.

58. Raz, , in Lloyd & Freeman, op cit., p 480 Google Scholar.

59. Atias, op cit, p 40; see also de Bellefonds, Linant, L'informatique et le droit (PUF, 2e édn, 1985) pp 79–80 Google Scholar.

60. Kelsen, , The Pure Theory of Law (California, 1967; trans Max Knight) pp 280ffGoogle Scholar.

61. Ibid, pp 281-284.

64. See Ellul, , Histoire des institutions: 1/2: L'Antiquité (PUF, 6e édn, 1984) pp 447–478 Google Scholar.

63. Is the nominalism and platonism debate a question of epistemology or ideology? See generally Adams, , ‘Universals in the Early Fourteenth Century’, in Kretzmann, , Kenny, & Pinborg, (eds), The Cambridge History of Later Medieval Philosophy (Cambridge, 1982) pp 411–439 CrossRefGoogle Scholar; cf Quillet, , ‘Community, Counsel and Representation’, in Burns, (ed), The Cambridge History of Medieval Political Thought (Cambridge, 1988) pp 561–564 Google Scholar. See also Ullmann, , Law and Politics in the Middle Ages (Sources of History, 1975) pp 25–50 Google Scholar.

64. Jones, op cit; Atias, , Thiorie contre arbitraire (PUF, 1987) pp 153–154 Google Scholar. See also, Tierney, , Religion, Law and the Growth of Constitutional Thought 115 & 1650 (Cambridge, 1982)CrossRefGoogle Scholar.

65. Durand, , La systémique (PUF, 3e édn, 1987) p 117 Google Scholar.

66. See generally Van de Kerchove, & Ost, , Le systéme juridigue entre ordre et désordre (PUF, 1988)Google Scholar.

67. Stein, , ‘The Development of the Institutional System’, in Stein, & Lewis, (eds), Studies in Justinian's Institutes in Memory of J.A.C. Thomas (Sweet & Maxwell, 1984) pp 151ffGoogle Scholar.

68. des Graviers, Jean, Le droit canonigue (PUF, 3e édn, 1981) p 62 Google Scholar.

69. Villey, , op cit, pp 513–540 Google Scholar.

70. Grzegorczyk, , ‘Evaluation critique du paradigme systémique dans la science du droit’, in Le système juridigue (Sirey, 1986) (31 Archives de philosophie du droit) 281 at pp 283–284 Google Scholar.

71. Pédamon, , Le droit allemand (PUF, 1985) pp 15–16 Google Scholar.

72. ibid, pp 23-24.

73. Kelson himself recognised that he was working within the pandectist tradition: Van de Kerchove & Ost, op cit, pp 32-33.

74. Stamatis, ‘La systématicité du droit chez Kelsen et les apriories de la norrne fondamentale’, Le système juridigue, op cit., 45 at pp 4546 Google Scholar; cf Tur, ‘the Kelsenian Enterprise’, in Tur, & Twining, (eds) Essays on Kelsen (Oxford, 1986) 149 at pp 156ff Google Scholar.

75. Troper, ‘Système juridique et Etat,’ in Le système juridigue, op cit, 29 at p 30 Google Scholar.

76. Grzegorczyk, , op cit., p 284 Google Scholar.

77. Stein, , Legal Evolution (Cambridge, 1980) p 63 Google Scholar.

78. Durand, , op cit, pp 7–8 Google Scholar.

79. Durand, op cit, p 11; Le Moigne, La théorie du système général (PUF, 2e édn, 1984) pp 15-16, 55.

80. Gourbeaux, , ‘Personnalité morale, droit des prrsonnes et droit des biens’, in Etudes Roblot (LGDJ, 1984), pp 199–215 Google Scholar.

81. Blanché, , L'axiomatique (PUF, 6e édn, 1980) pp 83–84 Google Scholar.

82. Ibid, p 84.

83. Ibid, p 85.

84. Blanché, , La science actuelle et le rationalisme (PUF, 2e édn, 1973) p 5 Google Scholar.

85. Villey, , op cit, pp 536, 538Google Scholar.

86. Domat, Les lois ciuiles dans leur ordre nuturel (1694).

87. Gaudemet, , ‘Tentatives de systematisation du droit à Rome’, in Le système juridique, op cit, pp 11–28 Google Scholar.

88. Watson, , The Making of the Civil Law (Harvard, 1981) pp 14–22 Google Scholar.

89. d'Entrèves, Nutural Law (Hutchinson, 2nd edn, 1970) p 33; Schulz, , History of Roman Legal Science (Oxford, 1946) p 137 Google Scholar.

90. See generally Stein, Development of the Institutional System, op cit; Gaudemet, op cit.

91. Gaudemet, , op cit, p 28 Google Scholar.

92. Blanché, , L'épistemologic, op cit, p 36 Google Scholar.

93. Ellul, , Histoire des institutions: 3-Le Moyen Age (PUF, 9e édn, 1982) p 18 Google Scholar.

94. Cf Raz, in Lloyd & Freeman, op cit, pp 476-483.

95. D1.1.1pr.

96. D1.1.10; 1.3.41.

97. Roubier, , Théorie générale du droit (Sirey, 2e édn, 1951) pp 19–20 Google Scholar.

98. D1.1.11.

99. See eg, D16.3.31.1.

100. Blanché, , La science actuelle el le rationalisme, op cit, p 124 Google Scholar.

101. The Classical period of Roman law is roughly the first two and a half centuries AD. For a discussion of Roman legal history see Kunkel, , An Introduction to Roman Legal and Constitutional History (Oxford, 2nd edn, 1973; trans Kelly) esp pp 95–124 Google Scholar.

102. Pédamon, , op cit, pp 16, 24Google Scholar.

103. D1.1.4; 1.5.4.1.

104. D38.10.4.2; 38.10.10.4.

105. An interesting selection of Digest texts on the Roman law of tort is now available to the general reader: Kolbert, (ed) Justinian: The Digest of Roman Law (Penguin, 1979)Google Scholar. This book will act as an excellent introduction for those who are unfamiliar with Roman law and legal reasoning; and it will quickly dispel the view that there is anything unsophisticated about Roman legal reasoning in relation to modern judicial techniques. Indeed the self-referencing between the component parts of the institutional systems model, and between the concept of law, institutional technical models, is especially well brought out by these tort texts.

106. Astolfi, & Develay, , La didactique des sciences (PUF, 1989) p 97 Google Scholar.

107. Cf Susskind, , op cit., pp 78–79 Google Scholar.

108. Cf Dworkin, , Law's Empire, op cif, p 14 Google Scholar.

109. Astolfi, & Develay, , op cit, pp 42ffGoogle Scholar.

110. Ibid, pp 24-25.

111. Ellul, , Le Moyen Age, op cit, pp 27–28 Google Scholar.

114. Constitutio Tanta 11; cf Astolfi & Develay, op cit., p 44.

113. Linant de Bellefonds, op cit, p 181.

114. Blanché, , La science actuelle cf le rationalisme, op cit, pp 117–124 Google Scholar.

115. Blanché, , L'induction scientifique el les lois naturelles (PUF, 1975) p 162 Google Scholar.

116. See Szramkiewicz, , Histoire du droit des affairs (Montchrestien, 1989) pp 31ffGoogle Scholar

117. Astolfi, & Develay, , op cit, p 95 Google Scholar.

118. de Bellefonds, Linat, op cit, p 81 Google Scholar; Bertrand, op cit.

119. D1.1.1.2.

120. D 1.1.5.6.

121. D1.1.1.3.

122. D1.1.1.4.

123. D1.1.7; 1.3.32.

124. D1.4.1.

125. Ellul, , Histoire des institutions: 1/2 - L'Anliquité (PUF, 6e édn, 1984) p 416 Google Scholar; Histoire de la propagande (PUF, 2e édn, 1976) pp 27ff.

126. D2.14.7.14, 38, 42.

127. See eg, D39.4.9.8; and see generally Mestre, , Introduction historique au droit administratif francis (PUF, 1985) pp 106–108 Google Scholar.

128. See eg, D39.4.9.5.

149. See eg, D39.4.9.5; 43.9.1.1.

130. D22.6.2.

131. See eg, D36.1.14 (and D36.1.13.5).

132. D1. 1.1.1.

133. D1.1.1pr.

134. See White, , Grounds of Liability (Oxford, 1985) pp 7–8 Google Scholar.

135. Stein, , Legal Institutions (Butterworths, 1984) p 127 Google Scholar; Ellul, , Le Moyen Age, op cit, pp 23–25 Google Scholar.

136. G1.8; D 1.5.1. (G = Gaius, Institutes). A new translation of Gains is now available: Gordon, & Robinson, (trans), The Institutes of Caius (Duckworth, 1988)Google Scholar.

137. Birks, & McLeod, , op cit, pp 7–28 Google Scholar.

138. D1.1.12.

139. D1.1.11; 1.3.41.

140. G4.48; D1.3.41.

141. But cf D36.1.17.3: ‘nec enim posse ex iure deduci quantitatern’.

142. G4.4.

143. G4.1-3;53.13. (J =Justinian, Institutes). For a new translation of Justinian's Institutes see Birks & McLeod, op cit.

144. Stein, , ‘The Fate of the Institutional System’, Huldigingsbundel Paul van Warmelo (Pretoria, 1984) pp 218–227 Google Scholar, reprinted in Stein, , The Character and Inzuence of the Roman Civil Law (Hambledon, 1988) pp 73–82 Google Scholar.

145. G2.14.

146. Gaudemet, op cit, pp 21-22.

147. Ellul, , Le Meyon Age, op cit, pp 344–354 Google Scholar.

148. See eg, D49.14.3.71F.

149. D41.2.2.

150. CfD4.3.15.1.

151. D50.16.16.

152. Ellul, , Le Meyon Age, op cit, pp 27–28 Google Scholar.

153. D1.4.1.

154. C7.37.3. (C = Justinian's Codex).

155. Roubier, , Théorie générale, op cit, pp 66–67 Google Scholar.

156. Combacau, , ‘Le droit international: bric-à-bracou système?’, in Le systèeme juridique, op cit, 85 at pp 87ffGoogle Scholar.

157. D25.4.1.11; Atias, , Théorie contre arbitraire, op cit, pp 127, 137, 204-205Google Scholar.

158. Ellul, , Le Moyen Age, op cit, pp 23ffGoogle Scholar.

159. See eg, D9.2.27.5q and see generally D50.16 de verborum significatione.

160. See eg, D44.7.25.1, 52. Much of the factual analysis was as a result of the many different types of action available in the classical period which in turn were related to different sources: eg, civil law, praetorian law, etc. This is well brought out in the title devoted to the Lex Aquilia (D9.2, see Kolbert, op cit). Note also the relationship between remedies, institutions and sources: D6.1.23pr and D44.2.14.3.

161. See eg, D9.2.29.2ff.

162. See eg, D9.2.12 (‘ad exemplum’). See also D14.6.8; 43.18.1.9.

163. See eg, D2.14.1.3; 9.2.23.1; 9.4.13; 12.5.4.3.

164. See generally Kolbert, op cit. This is of course the technique of precedent and so the iurists were also adept at ‘distinguishing’ other opinions: see eg, D41.2.3.23.

165. Bergel, , Thiorie zinirale, op cit, p 264 Google Scholar.

166. D5.1.74pr; and see now French Civil Code, art 4.

167. See D9.2.27.29.

168. Cf D42.1.32.

169. See eg, D24.1.50.

170. See D9.2.33 pr; 9.4.7 (cf 9.2.13pr).

171. Champaud, , Le droit des affaires (PUF, 2e édn, 1984) pp 38–39 Google Scholar; and see eg, D24.3.7.

172. Cf Lawson, , Negligence in the Civil Law (Oxford, 1950) pp 37–40 Google Scholar.

173. See Lawson, supra.

174. See eg, D9.2.51.2: ‘multa autem iure civili contra rationem disputandi pro utilitate communi recepta esse innumerabilibus rebus probari potest’.

175. Excellent examples are provided in Kolbert, op cit.

176. Blanché, La science actuelle et le rationalisme, opp cit, p 119.

177. Combacan, , op cit, pp 86–87 Google Scholar.

178. Cf ibid, p229.

179. Myrdal, in Lloyd & Freeman, op cit, p 36.

180. Cf Van de Kerchove & Ost, op cit, pp 47ff.

181. Cf Susskind, op cit, p 173.

182. See eg, D5.1.76; 41.3.30.

183. See generally Adams, op cit, and Quillet, op cit.

184. See D5.1.76.

185. See eg, Pugliese, ‘“Res corporales”, “res incorporales” e il problema del diritto soggettivo’, Studi Arangio-Ruiz Uovene, 1953) III, 223, 225–230 Google Scholar.

186. Atias, , Epistémologie, op cit, pp 79–97 Google Scholar.

187. Susskind, op cit, p 155.