The use of a mechanical device is an ancient and crude form of contraception. Desert dwellers in ancient Africa placed stones in the uteruses of their camels to prevent conception during long treks across the Sahara. The metal intrauterine devices (IUDs) used in the late 1800s caused severe pelvic infections that, in the absence of antibiotics, often proved fatal. The first stainless steel and polyethelene IUDs were developed around 1960, and these attained a relatively reliable degree of safety. New compositions and materials decreased the risk of infection, and innovative devices could be inserted without dilating the cervix.

As mechanical means of contraception grew in popularity, pharmaceutical companies began to fight for a competitive edge, each touting the design or materials of its product as safer and niore efficient. By the mid-l970s, it is estimated, more than 15 million IUDs had been distributed throughout the world, many in developing nations.

Advances in medical technology have a habit of raising new, and usually unexpected, ethical and legal questions. Such questions arise when patients or physicians, for a variety of reasons, defer cardiopulmonary resuscitation (CPR) or other treatment with so-called no-code or do-not-resuscitate (DNR) orders. When all parties to the DNR order, including physicians, patient, and family, agree that it is appropriate in a given case, there is rarely controversy. However, when one party dissents from a no-code status, most commentators agree, grave moral, social, and legal questions are raised.

The most troublesome issues concerning DNR orders arise when physicians and family disagree about the appropriateness of such an order in the case of a mentally incompetent patient. These episodes not only raise complex legal issues but also go to the heart of, and challenge, modern medical ethics and the relationship of doctor to patient.

Every year thousands of patients suffer injury while attempting to make use of bathroom facilities. In addition to the suffering and protracted inpatient care that these incidents cause, hospitals have been faced with staggering costs in the form of increased insurance premiums arising directly out of an increased number of lawsuits. This problem has reached a proportion such that it clearly deserves careful and indepth industry study.

This article, while far from a comprehensive study, will attempt to draw certain conclusions and perhaps dispel certain myths based upon a study of 181 patient falls at a 200+-bed community hospital in the Northeastern United States.

In the not too distant past, hospitals could not generally be held legally responsible for failure to raise bedrails absent specific medical direction. Such was the case because few, if any, hospitals had guidelines or procedures for the placement of bedrails in the absence of a physician's order.

Virtually every state gives psychiatrists’ patients a broad statutory privilege to prevent the disclosure in legal proceedings of information about their diagnosis and treatment. Although the precise scope of the privilege varies from state to state, and a variety of exceptions are widely recognized, the contents of therapy sessions—and hence of psychiatrists’ written records of therapy sessions—are ordinarily protected by the privilege. Patients thus are gmerally entitled to prevent the courts and other government authorities from using their coercive evidencr-gathering powers to obtain psychiatric records or testimony about therapy. In conjunction with psychiatrists’ ethical and legal duties of confidentiality toward their patients outside legal proceedings, the privilege renders the privacy of the psychiatric relationship to a large degree sacrosanct.

The cloak of secrecy around the psychiatrist-patient relationship, however, must inevitably be lifted to some extent when third parties pay for psychiatric diagnosis and treatment. Any third-party payer, be it a private insurer or a government agency (such as Medicaid or Medicare), must be able to obtain enough information about psychiatric services to determine the propriety of claims for payment for those services.