This report describes a study of the effects of a Scandinavian-style law concerning alcohol-impaired driving. The past two decades have seen the adoption throughout most of the developed world of drinking-and-driving laws based on principles originally developed in Norway and Sweden. The French law of July 12, 1978, was a part of this general development. Interrupted time-series analysis of French data on crash-related injuries and fatalities shows that the 1978 law had a notable deterrent effect, but that the effect was not permanent.

The paper identifies five presumptions of dispute theorizing: universality, ideological functionalism, settlement by courts, qualitative identity of the parties, and comparability. It is argued that these presumptions derive from or are related to the methodology of dispute theorizing, which is idealist either in the form of abstracted empiricism or logical deduction. Reasons for the sudden upsurge in dispute theorizing are discussed. Concluding, the authors evaluate attempts by dispute theorists to break away from the presumptions identified, and indicate some empirically limited but theoretically useful possibilities for futher work.

Why do attorneys utilize social science experts in school desegregation cases? Although experts often testify for both parties in these cases, plaintiff lawyers are more likely than defense lawyers to call upon them. Plaintiff lawyers appear to have easier access to a network of scholars willing to testify. Moreover, plaintiff lawyers have a set of social theories and legal strategies that often requires the use of social science expertise. Although the testimony offered by social scientists is often not directly relevant to the legal issues in a trial, it is part of the attorney's attempt to educate or persuade the judge to a particular view of race relations and education.

The USSR can survive without the rule of law which characterizes most western democracies, because the force of Soviet law lies in individuals, rather than codified regulations. The iuriskonsult (legal advisor), who personalizes legal authority, increases the stability of the system and provides tangible benefits for the economic and social order. Many Soviet citizens find solutions to their legal problems as a result of the iuriskonsult's assistance, and this convinces them of the justness of the Soviet system. Iuriskonsulty can increase the economic efficiency of an organization, provide financial gains for workers, and improve the quality of labor relations. The impact of the lawyer on his organization is determined by the latitude accorded him by his manager.

During a three-year panel study, the job aspirations of University of Denver law students changed so as to reduce the economic supply of public interest attorneys. Elementary economic theory suggests that this reduction in supply has an important impact on the size and quality of the public interest bar. Both demand and supply must be considered in attempts to increase the number and quality of public interest attorneys. Although this study does not attempt to explain the reasons for changes in students' job aspirations, reformers attempting to increase economic supply should not ignore the potential impact of legal education.

Economism is seen as having a number of disadvantages compared with legalism as the preferred model for regulating hazardous industrial practices such as pollution. Economism forces public policy to react retrospectively to hazards when efforts could be made to prevent the hazard before it occurs. Economism engenders a moral relativism which weakens the moral force of law; it makes detection and deterrence more difficult than under legalism. The regulatory approaches of economism may involve reduced cost burdens on business but lesser predictability of those costs. Economism does not relieve business of the burdens of government inspections; it simply replaces technical inspectors with tax investigators because taxes on hazards can easily be evaded. Legalism, unlike economism, is not wedded to the assumption that business enterprises always behave rationally. In practical terms it is impossible to calculate economically optimal levels of taxes on social harm. Even if it were possible, the costs of making such calculations would be prohibitive. It is concluded that economistic strategies have quite limited, though important, roles in business regulation.