While undergoing training in professional school, students are assumed to experience attitude change, internalizing the norms of their future profession. In law school this change is thought to be particularly conservative, reflecting a business orientation and a minimal concern with pro bono and social reform work. This paper examines these assumptions by presenting data from a panel study of students at the University of Wisconsin-Madison Law School. Although some changes in attitudes are found, they are much smaller than suggested by recent critical literature on legal education. These findings lead to the proposal of a research agenda that stresses the contribution of the job market as well as that of education in fostering a traditional orientation toward the role of lawyers and the law.

The place of law in the state is largely the result of political struggle, which can be understood better by looking at social and political rather than cultural variables. Informed by Weberian models of legitimacy and political structure and by Marxist concepts of class conflict, the article analyzes efforts to establish an Indonesian “law state” in the context of middle-class assaults on patrimonial assumptions of political order. It concentrates primarily on issues that arose in the consideration of a new law on judicial organization and authority. Groups that favored fundamental political and legal change focused on the judiciary as a means of gaining access to and influence in the state and of imposing limits on the exercise of political power. They failed, but the struggle goes on, complicated by strains within the growing middle stratum of the population.

A sample survey of 800 Oregon adults showed that nearly one in four admit they practice evasion. Higher percentages were found for people who were young, with low income, male, and who believed their chance of getting caught was low. Occupational prestige and belief that the tax system is unfair were unrelated to noncompliance. Differential opportunities to practice evasion is a promising explanation, and the deterrent effect of penalties seems uncertain. The evidence suggests conceptualizing tax evasion as a white-collar crime by the nature of the violation and not by the characteristics of the offender.

This article uses Friedman and Percival's (1976) longitudinal survey of the caseloads of two California courts as a vehicle for addressing two conceptual issues that must be resolved in studies of the dispute settlement function of courts. First, one must decide whether the focus of inquiry is on the way courts function (i.e., act) or on the function that courts fill for some larger community. The methodological implications of this decision are discussed. Second, one must decide what counts as judicial contributions to dispute settlement. Seven possible contributions are identified. This article then reanalyzes Friedman and Percival's data on the Alameda and San Benito County courts, controlling for adult population. Reanalysis indicates that these data do not support the conclusion that the courts Friedman and Percival studied became functionally less important to community dispute settlement with increasing socio-economic development. This portion of the article suggests possible causes of some of the patterns observed, and discusses some of the problems that arise in working with longitudinal data culled from court dockets.

The convergence of the forces of national competition among ideologically diverse political parties with the development of a squatter settlement movement brought the issue of neighborhood courts to national attention. In the face of Congressional stalemate over a national decentralization, two local experiments emerged, one employing professional judges holding regular informal hearings beyond their normal judicial duties for poor urban residents, the other involving left-organized squatter settlements' establishment of their own “extra-official” court systems using locally elected lay judges. The organizational and political contexts of the two, and their implicit ideological distinctions, led to somewhat different caseloads and distinct dispute processing styles. The professional court tended to routinize disputes, arbitrate, and rely on state police power; the lay court tended to mediate, focus upon sociological and political causes of disputes, and use formal and informal enforcement power. Each encountered severe constraints inhibiting development and institutionalization. These stemmed from lack of organizational resources and clear-cut goals, and the priorities of the organizational contexts in which they attempted to function. These priorities were, in turn, reflected in the class-based conflict encompassing Chilean politics during the Allende period.