The significance of apology after serious injury depends on social and cultural factors that appear to be understood differently in Japan and America. As a consequence, what is considered a sincere apology is not the same in the two societies. Moreover, the role of an apology as an ingredient in the formal resolution of legal disputes diverges. Salient legal aspects of apology are discussed, along with the possibilities that an apology may be a defense to a claim, that it may be an admission of another's claim, and that an apology may be a legal remedy for injury. The role in Japan of the formal letter of apology, shimatsusho, is described. It is suggested that apology may be an underdeveloped aspect of dispute resolution in America. There are some injuries when an apology alone surely is inadequate compensation, but there are other injuries when traditional common law remedies are unsatisfactory and an apology may be a crucial element in the recognition and restoration of human relationship.

In this comment the author argues that Wagatsuma and Rosett correctly identify a critical cultural influence on the role of law and legal process in Japan. He suggests, however, a broader view of the implications of apology, notably for the United States in both civil and criminal suits.

The juvenile court in Italy was established many years after those in the United States and other European countries. Even after its creation problems of differentiation and staffing remained, and delays plus ineffective services continue to complicate day-to-day operations of the juvenile courts. I propose that the juvenile court in Italy has been a spurious development, reflecting contradictions between the culture of legal certainty and familism, and the adoption of a pattern of discretionary justice based on the positivism of Ferri. Operations of the juvenile court resemble rituals aimed to satisfy conflicting values. Signs are that its legitimacy has been weakened and that other forms of social control have emerged or reemerged.

Recent perceptual studies of general deterrence have been guided by an unnecessarily narrow conception of general deterrence, despite the methodological advances in this type of research. These studies, moreover, have failed to recognize the complexity of the perceptual processes that intervene between the threat or experience of legal sanctions and behavioral outcomes. Consequently, the conclusions drawn from the findings about the process of general deterrence are questionable. This paper critically reviews perceptual studies of general deterrence with a view toward expanding the scope of deterrence theory and stimulating research in new directions. Suggestions are made about the kinds of data and analyses needed to test such theory more adequately.

While Max Weber is revered as one of the patron saints of the law and society movement, his views on the nature and limits of sociological studies in law are not fully understood. Using recent analyses of Weber's legal thought (Kronman, 1983) and overall social theory (Alexander, 1983a), the author argues that while Weber set forth the standard, positivist understanding of the sociology of law that influences research to this day, at the same time he critiqued this understanding and in the end despaired that social science could contribute significantly to human emancipation. Arguing that Weber's tragic modernism is an inappropriate guide for law and society studies today, the author suggests an alternative vision in which the sociology of law is seen as part of a pragmatic enterprise of social transformation.