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Trouble-Cases and Trouble-Less Cases in the Study of Customary Law and Legal Reform
Published online by Cambridge University Press: 01 July 2024
Extract
I first went, as a student, into the field (Zululand, 1938) without the benefit of a clear theory of investigation of customary law. Llewellyn and Hoebel's Cheyenne Way (1941) had not yet appeared; and years later, when I ended my field-work among some Rhodesian Shona tribes (1952), Hoebel's classic The Law of Primitive Man, which further elaborated the theoretical angle of this kind of inquiry (1954: Ch. 1-4) had yet to be published. I did not, however, course entirely haphazardly through this field. I was trained in (mainly African) ethnography and (Roman Dutch) law, had learnt to read the decisions and interpretations of (South African) European courts on “native law and custom” with some critical reservation, and had found in works like Schapera's Handbook of Tswana Law and Custom (1938) — probably still the best of its kind as regards Africa — a suitable, systematic frame for the pursuit of my inquiries and the exposition of my findings. Moreover, my home background had acquainted me with some of the work and aims of Dutch scholars on Indonesian adatlaw who, inspired by the great jurist Van Vollenhoven, then seemed to be leading the field with their efforts to arrange the rich variety of Indonesian folk law and practice into a coherent system with a distinctly indigenous imprint. Van Vollenhoven's early and repeated insistence upon the need “het oostersche oostersch te zien” (to perceive that which is oriental through oriental eyes), instead of seeking to fit Indonesian concepts into the familiar categories and analytical schemas of Western jurisprudence, had obvious application also to the African field.
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- Copyright © The Law and Society Association, 1973.
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