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Regulatory Pragmatism, Legal Knowledge and Compliance with Law in Areas of State Weakness

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  01 January 2024

Susan L. Ostermann
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Abstract

The literature suggests that compliance with law is unlikely in areas of state weakness absent additional state capacity. Utilizing three novel data sets collected in adjacent districts in India and Nepal, this article demonstrates that weak states can significantly increase compliance by fostering accurate legal knowledge—something the literature often assumes is widespread. This assumption is problematic because principal–agent problems prevent many weak states from behaving consistently; target populations often lack education and competent legal advice and struggle to learn about the law via observation. States that employ regulatory pragmatism, however, may overcome this challenge; they do so by designing implementation strategies for on-the-ground realities. I investigate two such efforts—delegated enforcement and information dissemination through local leaders. The data indicate that strategies consistent with regulatory pragmatism, in contrast to those that are legally doctrinaire or deterrence based significantly increase legal knowledge and compliance, even where the state is locally weak.

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Articles
Information
Law & Society Review , Volume 53 , Issue 4 , December 2019 , pp. 1132 - 1166
Copyright
© 2019 Law and Society Association.

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