Published online by Cambridge University Press: 01 July 2024
A number of writers have observed that legalism is a social phenomenon which is found only in certain kinds of legal systems and then only in certain historical periods. Perhaps it was Weber who first gave the concept a theoretical importance by associating a legalistic or “formally rational” legal system with the development of capitalism. Later writers such as Selznick have seen legalism as a complex ideal embracing certain kinds of standards to which legal systems might aspire. (Selznick, 1961). Most recently, Friedman has commented on the decline of legalism (Friedman, 1966). While the contributions of these writers are useful in elaborating the meaning of the concept of legalism, the phenomenon itself has received virtually no empirical analysis. It is the purpose of this paper to show that one possible component of legalism, viz., predictability, is by no means unique to legalism and that a nonlegalistic adjudicatory system can be as predictable if not more predictable than a legalistic system would be.
AUTHOR'S NOTE: The materials presented in this article are drawn from the author's doctoral dissertation, “Commercial Arbitration; A Study in the Regulation of Interorganizational Conflict” (New York University, 1970: I would like to acknowledge the support and encouragement of Professor Erwin O. Smigel, New York University, who served as principal thesis advisor.