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The Poverty of Evolutionism: A Critique of Teubner's Case for “Reflexive Law”
Published online by Cambridge University Press: 01 July 2024
Abstract
The concept of “reflexive law” contains two mutually contradictory elements: a doctrine of legal restraint and the notion that restraint can be achieved by procedural rather than substantive regulation. This critique argues that new procedures have historically not replaced substantive regulation but instead have repeatedly introduced more substantive and more formal regulations. Teubner's thesis that “reflexive law” manifests an “evolutionary tendency” is refuted, just as is the claim that his thesis could be inferred from sociological theories such as those of Luhmann or Habermas. As is so often the case in legal theory, “evolutionism” is used as a mask for the legitimation of presumably “progressive” legal ideas.
- Type
- Commentary and Debate
- Information
- Copyright
- Copyright © 1984 by The Law and Society Association
Footnotes
This paper was prepared for the German-American Conference on “Reflexive Law and the Regulatory Crisis,” July 1983, in Madison, Wisconsin. I am deeply indebted to David Trubek, who facilitated this meeting as well as the written version of my contribution. Cathy Menschievitz and Richard Lempert helped to bring it into decent English.
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