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Pittsburgh, City of Bridges: Developing a Rational Approach to Interdisciplinary Discourse on Law

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  01 January 2024

Kenneth G. Dau-Schmidt
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Abstract

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Type
Comment on the Presidential Address
Information
Law & Society Review , Volume 38 , Issue 2 , June 2004 , pp. 199 - 206
Copyright
© 2004 Law and Society Association.

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Footnotes

I would like to thank Ajay Mehrotra for useful comments on this article.

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