Published online by Cambridge University Press: 02 April 2024
This article is part of a larger study about the factors shaping the exercise of discretion by Immigration and Naturalization Service (INS) inspectors. It focuses on an infrequently examined topic: how agency behavior is affected when government depends on private enterprise to help enforce legal requirements. My examination of the INS's relationship with international airlines reveals that airlines are part of a third-party liability system. Airlines are mandated by law to screen foreign travelers prior to transporting them to the United States, in order to ensure foreign travelers' admissibility to the country, as well as required to remove all inadmissible travelers at airline cost. The study shows how third-party liability requirements generate a complex system of exchange relations and dependence between the INS and international airlines, a system that affects in important ways how the INS handles the cases of suspected inadmissible travelers.
This article is drawn from a larger study of immigration inspection work supported by the National Science Foundation (SES-8911263) and the American Bar Foundation. The study would not have been possible without the extensive assistance of the Immigration and Naturalization Service. I am deeply indebted to the Immigration Service District Director, whose personal interest and considerable efforts made this scholarly study possible. I also thank the Port Director, supervisors, and inspectors who generously gave of their time to help answer my numerous questions. Helpful comments on earlier drafts were received from anonymous reviewers and from John Braithwaite, William L. F. Felstiner, Gary T. Marx, John R. Schmidt, and Susan Shapiro. A very special word of appreciation goes to Robert M. Emerson whose many suggestions and valuable insights I have drawn on in preparing this article.