Published online by Cambridge University Press: 02 April 2024
The role of the bench as the sponsoring organization of trial judges largely remains a mystery to political science. Borrowing from organizational theory the metaphor of loose coupling, a characteristic of many American political institutions, this article explores the tension between elements of loose and tight coupling within the sponsoring organization of judges (the bench) and the consequences of that tension for the distribution of services to clients of trial courts. The article identifies three sets of consequences: (1) The locus and style of innovation is acutely circumscribed by these tensions; in the court that is studied, assertive leadership and punctuated change are less likely than conciliar leadership and incremental change. (2) The juxtaposition of loosely and tightly coupled elements promote responsiveness to powerful clientele interests. (3) Responsiveness to powerful clientele interests leads to a distribution of resources that short-changes less influential clients of the court.
The manuscript for this article was accepted for publication a few weeks after the death of Herbert Jacob, its author. Review of the copyediting and proofreading was done by Kenneth Janda of the Department of Political Science at Northwestern University.