From the Editor

Extract

One of the reasons why social behavior is so much harder to understand than other phenomena is that it has meaning, both for the actor and for the observer. This is particularly true of law, which is preeminently an expression of values. A central question in the social theory of law has therefore been: what is the normative meaning of law for social actors? The answer to that question is often influenced by the values which the theorist attributes to the law. Isaac Balbus, in his article in this issue, denominates two extreme responses as instrumental pluralism and instrumental marxism. The first perceives law under western liberal capitalism as an ideal harmonization of the values of all citizens. The second sees that law as pure exploitation, an instrument of naked ruling class domination. All of the writers in this issue reject both extremes. The relationship—between the values of social actor or analytic observer, and legal reality—is far more complex. That complexity is often expressed as the “relative” autonomy of law, although the phrase may be more elliptical than illuminating. The recognition that law is related to, but also partly autonomous from, both economic infrastructure and normative superstructure, is obviously the beginning of analysis, not the end. Perhaps the most important contribution of the articles that follow is their determination to study those relationships empirically, rather than deducing them from ideological presuppositions, as has so often been done in the past.