Published online by Cambridge University Press: 01 January 2024
This article investigates possible ideological differences between circuits of the U.S. Courts of Appeals. It looks at the distribution of three-judge panel ideologies on the circuits and at differences in decisionmaking patterns, testing several theoretical approaches to circuit differences: the attitudinalist approach, arguing that different judicial ideologies account for intercircuit differences; historical-institutionalist approaches that argue that circuit norms lead to differences in the proportion of conservative decisions and in the effects of judicial ideologies; and the rational-choice institutionalist argument that overall circuit preferences constrain three-judge panel decisions through the en banc process. Using a multilevel logit model, the study finds some support for the attitudinalist and historical-institutionalist accounts of circuit differences. It also finds that intercircuit ideological differences contribute comparatively little to the prediction of appeals court outcomes.
An earlier version of this article was presented at the 2008 Annual Meeting of the American Political Science Association. I would like to thank Chris Blake, Suraj Jacobs, Carroll Seron, Steve Wasby, anonymous reviewers, and the editors of the Law & Society Review for comments and suggestions. I thank Rachel Mulheren for her research assistance.