Establishing the pattern of crime is fundamental for the successful investigation of international crimes (genocide, war crimes, and crimes against humanity). A pattern of crime is the aggregate of multiple incidents that share common features related to the victims, the perpetrators, and the modus operandi. Pattern evidence and analysis have been used successfully, mainly in the investigation of large‐scale killings, destruction, and displacement; the use for sexual violence charges has been remarkably more limited. There is a need to overcome this gap by setting proper methods of data collection and analysis. At the level of evidence collection, under‐reporting should be addressed through victimization surveys or secondary analysis of data available from different sources. At the level of analysis, the available evidence needs to be subject to impartial examination beyond the pre‐conceptions of the conflict parties and advocacy groups, in compliance with scientific standards for quantitative, qualitative, and GIS (Geographic Information Systems) methods. Reviewing the different investigative experiences and jurisprudence will help to set the right methodology and contribute most efficiently to putting an end to the impunity regarding sexual crimes.

Internal and international conflicts can often involve a level of impunity that allows sexual violence to persist unchecked by military and political leaders. The recent reversal by an appeals panel at the International Criminal Court of a pretrial decision not to charge President al‐Bashir of Sudan with genocide in Darfur offers an important foundation for introducing new types of evidence that can increase the investigation and prosecution of sexual violence during conflicts. The reversal cited the incorrect use of the “beyond a reasonable doubt” standard when the lesser standard of “reasonable grounds” applied. Social science provides methods and measures that can be uniquely used to develop reasonable grounds evidence, for example, to demonstrate the roles of physical perpetrators acting together in horizontal relationships, as well as to establish the indirect participation through vertical relationships of higher‐level defendants, in a chain of command of superior responsibility. We illustrate these points by presenting social science evidence of the responsibility of President al‐Bashir and middle‐ and lower‐level figures in genocidal violence in Darfur.

We examine whether the level of deference shown by the Israeli Supreme Court to military decisions has changed over time by empirically analyzing the entire body of Supreme Court decisions in petitions against the military commander between 1990 and 2005. Setting forth a number of different factors that might generally affect the degree of deference to state agencies, we hypothesized that there would be a decrease in deference in the relationship between the Court and the military commander during the examined period. Our findings show that deference to the military commander has indeed diminished significantly. We argue that this is best explained by the continuation of the armed conflict (and its aftermath, namely, the routinization and increase in the number of petitions by the civilian population) and also—to some extent—by the rise of a substantive rule‐of‐law legal consciousness, central to which is the importance of human rights.

By analyzing wills submitted for execution to Israeli tribunals in the years 2000–2004, this article offers insights into the process of the legalization of death and family relations. The length, aesthetics, phrasing, and contents of the wills examined are all evidence of a process in which the personal wishes of testators are transformed into a standardized legal document that tells very little about the individual testator. The rarity of cases in which testators do use their wills to disclose personal sentiments and thoughts highlights the neglected potential of wills to constitute a unique, personal, and emotional parting statement. The article demonstrates that this potential embodies the different ways in which wills were perceived in ancient times. Inspired by these past and present examples and on the basis of a bifocal relational perception of inheritance, I argue that lawyers should adopt a broader human understanding of wills and offer their clients the option of leaving behind a will with a soul.

This article explores the struggle for judicial power in Pakistan under Pervez Musharraf focusing on two questions. First, how did pro‐Musharraf regime judges expand judicial power, leading to a confrontation with the regime? Second, how did the bar and the bench mobilize in the struggle for judicial power? The author shows how, instead of blindly supporting economic liberalization in a period of economic growth, the Supreme Court expanded power by scrutinizing questionable urban development, privatization, and deregulation measures in a virtuous cycle of public interest litigation. The author also describes how a politics of reciprocity explains the social mobilization of lawyers as the bench protected the bar from regime penetration, and the bar protected the bench from regime backlash. The Pakistani case questions some of our assumptions about economic liberalization and courts in authoritarian regimes, and the study invites scholars to explore the role of courts in developing judicial support structures and the role of lawyers in social movements.

This essay views Gordon Silverstein's book Law's Allure: How Law Shapes, Constrains, Saves, and Kills Politics (2009) from the perspective of the burgeoning interbranch literature on law and courts, which seeks to place judicial decision making within the context of ongoing political and policy‐making processes. It argues that Law's Allure reflects the strengths and weaknesses of this literature. On the plus side, it compellingly reinterprets the concept of legal precedent in political terms, showing how the content of judicial decisions serves as an iterative framing mechanism within and across various policy areas. On the downside, it struggles to provide a rigorous framework for analyzing the risks of the juridification of American politics. Despite any weaknesses, its attempt to map different pathways of legalistic court‐based policy development in diverse settings represents a useful step for those interested in bringing the study of law and courts back into the core of analyzing American politics and policy making.

Gordon Silverstein'sLaw's Allure (2009) advances a two‐part thesis on the power of legal ideas. The first is that legal precedents establish the ideological baselines on which legislative and bureaucratic policies are developed. Silverstein amply demonstrates the validity of this thesis. The second is that by establishing ideological baselines, legal precedents contribute to a version of path dependency (or the idea that early choices determine long‐term developments) that is significantly more constraining than other forms of institutional entrenchment. Put simply, law shackles creativity in politics. This thesis I do not find persuasive, in part because Silverstein offers little evidence for it and in part because a growing body of literature suggests the contrary: the cross‐fertilization of ideas from one field to another—law to politics, for instance—contributes to, rather than retards, creative change. Nonetheless, while its broader ambitions are not satisfied, Law's Allure's narrow thesis—that precedent profoundly shapes policy development—is important and worthy of a major book in itself.

Using multiple case studies, Gordon Silverstein'sLaw's Allure (2009) examines the many ways in which courts interact with other governing institutions. He convincingly argues that legal advocates fare best when they use the leverage created by courtroom victories to increase their influence in other arenas, particularly legislatures. His more ambitious effort to explain when court intervention improves rather than displaces politics is less successful. He favors using court decisions as battering rams to break through the institutional barriers created by our allegedly outmoded Constitution. Such an open‐ended justification for judicial policy making places virtually no limits on the juridification that Silverstein decries for distorting democratic politics.

American political culture is both seduced and repulsed by legal power, and this essay reviews Gordon Silverstein's contribution to understanding the causes and consequences of “law's allure.” Using interbranch analysis, Silverstein argues that law is dangerously alluring as a political shortcut, but ultimately he concludes that law offers no exit from “normal politics” and the hard work of “changing minds.” This essay suggests that Silverstein's framework—his dyadic focus on courts and Congress, constructive and deconstructive patterns, legal formality and normal politics—strips law from its animating context of interests, inequality, and ideology. Without consideration of these larger forces of power, Silverstein's framework misplaces law's ability to “change minds” in perverse and unexpected ways.

Responding to a set of review essays, the author of Law's Allure: How Law Shapes, Constrains, Saves, and Kills Politics (Silverstein 2009) argues that politicians and policy entrepreneurs fail to calculate the risks of juridification—the judicialization of policy combined with the legalization of politics itself—which have expanded and accelerated in the United States in recent decades. Paradigmatic case studies (on subjects including poverty, electoral districting, automated budgeting, war powers, abortion laws, and the regulation of tobacco as well as the environment) illustrate the risks of various patterns of juridification and construct an agenda for future research.

Drawing on two books central to an emerging sociolegal literature about tort—Fault Lines: Tort Law as Cultural Practice, a collection edited by David M. Engel and Michael McCann, and Torts, Egalitarianism and Distributive Justice, a monograph by Tsachi Keren‐Paz—this essay argues that tort law in the United States redistributes wealth in ways that ought to trouble sociolegal scholars and enlist their reformist energy. Read together, the two volumes offer considerable description and critique of a distributive injustice, and lead to important proposals for change.

The late Philip Selznick's final book, A Humanist Science, examines the role of values and ideals in the social sciences, including the study of law and society. Throughout his academic career, Selznick was committed to what he called “legal naturalism,” a sociological version of the natural‐law perspective, while his critics continue to adhere to various forms of positivism. But the age‐old opposition between natural law and legal positivism today may be giving way to the quest for public sociology—a sociology that promotes public reflection on significant social issues and thus functions as a moral and political force. A Humanist Science ends with a strong plea for public philosophy. Public philosophy overlaps with public sociology but is a much stronger concept. Selznick's message of public philosophy may be another of his enduring contributions to the field of law and society.