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State Crimes of Previous Regimes: Knowledge, Accountability, and the Policing of the Past
Published online by Cambridge University Press: 27 December 2018
Abstract
The policy of lustration is set in the context of responses to abuses of power by previous regimes. Using examples from three recent forms of social reconstruction (in Latin America, the former communist states, and South Africa), the author reviews the “justice in transition” debate. How do societies going through democratization confront the human rights violations committed by the previous regime? Five aspects of this debate are reviewed: (1) truth: establishing and confronting the knowledge of what happened in the past; (2) justice: making offenders accountable for their past violations through three possible methods: punishment through the criminal law, compensation and restitution, and mass disqualification such as lustration; (3) impunity: giving amnesty to previous offenders; (4) expiation; and (5) reconciliation and reconstruction. A concluding discussion raises the implications of the subject for the study of time and social control.
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- Symposium: Law and Lustration: Righting the Wrongs of the Past
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- Copyright © American Bar Foundation, 1995
References
1 These three sets of transitions have been explicitly linked in the work of the New York-based Project on Justice in Times of Transition. The lessons from the Eastern European and Latin American cases for South Africa were the subject of a conference “Justice in Transition: Dealing with the Past,” held in Cape Town in February 1994. I am grateful to the organizers, IDASA (Institute for Democracy in South Africa), for their invitation to participate. The edited discussion of this conference is an excellent introduction to all the themes of my paper. See Alex Boraine et al., eds., Dealing with the Past: Truth and Reconciliation in South Africa (Cape Town: IDASA, 1994) (“Boraine, Dedng”). Google Scholar
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3 There is some inconsistency in the terminology. Sometimes “accountability” is used as a broad term to cover all modes of dealing with the past. Thus “truth” and “justice” are forms of accountability. Sometimes, “accountability” is used only in the narrower legal sense as synonymous with justice. My typology is based on this second, more restricted, notion.Google Scholar
4 In our context, this is what may be called the “Kurt Waldheim Syndrome.” There are two symptoms: (1) “At the time, I didn't know what was happening,” and/or (2) “I might have known at the time, but afterwards I forgot it all.” The syndrome appeared in the March 1994 Versailles trial of the French wartime collaborator, Paul Touvier. Asked whether he was aware of the Vichy government's anti-Jewish decrees, he replied, “No, I missed that.” Did he know of the mass deportations to Germany?“We didn't have television then. I didn't know about it” or “I don't remember. It was all too complicated for me.” Andrew Gumbel, “Touvier Retreats into Forgetfulness,”Gumdian, March 3, 1994.Google Scholar
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53 Erving Goffman, Relations in Public 113 (London: Allen Lane, 1971). I am grateful to Tom Scheff for drawing my attention to the ways in which rituals of apology appear in political conflicts as forms of acknowledgment. Some of these ideas appear in Thomas J. Scheff, Bloody Revenge: Nationalism, Emotion and War (Boulder, (Colo.: Westview Press, 1993).Google Scholar
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70 Thus in Romania, the trial and execution of the Ceausescus and the first trials of their henchmen were more reminiscent of Stalinist show trials than the Nuremberg precedent to which they appealed. Some have claimed that the death sentences were imposed on the day before the putative trial started and that variously edited videotapes of the trial were shown. Indeed, some cynical commentators have gone as far as to claim that the whole transition was faked. See Andrei Codrexo, The Hole in the Flag: Smoke and Mirrors in the Romanian Revolution (New York: Morrow Press, 1992).Google Scholar
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