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Ownership Rights and the Rites of Ownership
Published online by Cambridge University Press: 27 December 2018
Abstract
Using condominium owner and landowner narratives about their property, I consider how people answer the question, What does it mean to own something? These property narratives are framed around three sets of social practices, myths, and beliefs which I call rites of identity, rites of settlement, and rites of struggle—the rites of ownership. According to these narratives, ownership requires that the person possessing the property carry out these rites. Their sense of entitlement—ownership rights—is framed by these rites. Following the rites makes one a deserving property owner. Property rights are seen as protectors against arbitrary, unpredictable changes in status that violate these owners, sense that they are entitled to keep what they had worked so hard for and planned for so long. I conclude with a discussion of the value of property narratives for understanding the link between law and culture.
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- Copyright © American Bar Foundation, 1993
References
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The discourses of both the landowners and the leaseholders intersperse both crystal and mud ideas. On the one hand, the landowners take a strong crystal approach when they argue “a lease is a lease is a lease!” On the other hand, while the landowners were more than willing to label the lessees as persons outside the community, these same landowners wanted the law to recognize the special needs that emanated from their desire to keep their land as a family legacy. The lessees reverse this pattern. Their stories, particularly about identity, describe a world of cool and distant relationships, yet their interpretation of contract law stresses the need for flexibility.Google Scholar
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