Hostname: page-component-586b7cd67f-g8jcs Total loading time: 0 Render date: 2024-11-28T02:36:32.408Z Has data issue: false hasContentIssue false
  • English
  • Français

Let’s Talk: What FinReg Can Learn from New Governance (and Vice Versa)

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  11 October 2019

Kimberly D. Krawiec
Get access Rights & Permissions [Opens in a new window]

Abstract

Lauren Edelman’s Working Law: Courts, Corporation, and Symbolic Civil Rights (2016) is remarkably relevant to the study of financial regulation. In particular, three factors that Edelman identifies as contributing to legal endogeneity and symbolic compliance—ambiguous law, a lack of clear outcome measures, and the presence of legal intermediaries—are especially salient in this context. It has long been recognized that powerful financial institutions and the lawyers, lobbyists, and other agents who serve them have the ability to influence the law ex ante, through political lobbying. Edelman’s work reinforces the point that they may also do so ex post through an endogenous process of interpretation, implementation, and, ultimately, enshrinement of symbolic compliance with ambiguous law.

Type
Symposium on Legal Endogeneity: Lauren Edelman’s Working Law
Information
Law & Social Inquiry , Volume 44 , Issue 4 , November 2019 , pp. 1241 - 1250
Copyright
© 2019 American Bar Foundation 

Access options

Get access to the full version of this content by using one of the access options below. (Log in options will check for institutional or personal access. Content may require purchase if you do not have access.)

References

REFERENCES

Appelbaum, Binyamin. “On Finance Bill, Lobbying Shifts to Regulations.” New York Times, June 27, 2010.Google Scholar
Arlen, Jennifer H. “The Failure of the Organizational Sentencing Guidelines.” University of Miami Law Review 66, no. 3 (2012): 321–62.Google Scholar
Ayres, Ian, and Braithwaite, John. Responsive Regulation: Transcending the Deregulation Debate. New York: Oxford University Press, 1992.Google Scholar
Baker, Scott, and Krawiec, Kimberly D.. “The Penalty Default Canon.” George Washington Law Review 72, no. 4 (2003): 663–723.Google Scholar
Bardach, Eugene, and Kagan, Robert Allen. Going by the Book: The Problem of Regulatory Unreasonableness. 2d ed. New Brunswick, NJ: Transaction Publishers, 2002.Google Scholar
Basel Committee on, Banking Supervision Overview Paper for the Impact Study. Basel, Switzerland: Bank for International Settlements, 2002.Google Scholar
Baxter, Lawrence G. “Adaptive Financial Regulation and RegTech: A Concept Article on Realistic Protection for Victims of Bank Failures.” Duke Law Journal 66, no. 3 (2016): 567–604.Google Scholar
Black, Julia. Rules and Regulators. Oxford, UK: Clarendon Press, 1997.10.1093/acprof:oso/9780198262947.001.0001CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Baxter, Lawrence G. “Forms and Paradoxes of Principles-Based Regulation.” Capital Markets Law Journal 3, no. 4 (2008): 425–57.Google Scholar
Braithwaite, John. “Rules and Principles: A Theory of Legal Certainty.” Australian Journal of Legal Philosophy 27 (2002): 47–82.Google Scholar
Claessens, Stijn, and Kodres, Laura E.. “The Regulatory Responses to the Global Financial Crisis: Some Uncomfortable Questions.” In Policy Shock: Recalibrating Risk and Regulation after Oil Spills, Nuclear Accidents and Financial Crises, edited by Balleisen, Edward, Bennear, Lori S., Krawiec, Kimberly D., and Wiener, Jonathan B., 435–84. Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press, 2017.10.1017/9781316492635.016CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Coates, John C. IV “The Goals and Promise of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act.” Journal of Economic Perspectives 21, no. 1 (2007): 91–116.10.1257/jep.21.1.91CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Coglianese, Cary, and Nash, Jennifer. “Management-Based Strategies: An Emerging Approach to Environmental Protection.” In Leveraging the Private Sector: Management-Based Strategies for Improving Private Sector Environmental Performance, edited by Coglianese, Cary and Nash, Jennifer, 3–30. Washington, DC: Resources for the Future, 2006.Google Scholar
Davis Polk & Wardwell LLP. “Memorandum to Clients and Friends: Summary of the Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act, Enacted into Law on July 21, 2010.” July 21, 2010.Google Scholar
Dobbin, Frank, Schrage, Daniel, and Kalev, Alexandra. “Rage against the Iron Cage: The Varied Effects of Bureaucratic Personnel Reforms on Diversity.” American Sociological Review 80, no. 5 (2015): 1014–44.10.1177/0003122415596416CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Edelman, Lauren B. Working Law: Courts, Corporations, and Symbolic Civil Rights. Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 2016.Google Scholar
Edelman, Lauren B., Uggen, Christopher, and Erlanger, Howard S.. “The Endogeneity of Legal Regulation: Grievance Procedures as Rational Myth.” American Journal of Sociology 105, no. 2 (1999): 406–54.10.1086/210316CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Epstein, David, and O’Halloran, Sharyn. Delegating Powers: A Transaction Cost Politics Approach to Policy Making under Separate Powers. Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press, 1999.10.1017/CBO9780511609312CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Ford, Cristie L. “New Governance, Compliance, and Principles-Based Securities Regulation.” American Business Law Journal 45, no. 1 (2008): 1–60.10.1111/j.1744-1714.2008.00050.xCrossRefGoogle Scholar
Frantz, Douglas. “Trial Lawyers, Their Money and Their Influence Have Become Issues in the Campaign.” New York Times, October 13, 1996.Google Scholar
Getter, Darryl E. Congressional Research Service: U.S. Implementation of the Basel Capital Regulatory Framework, 2014.Google Scholar
Grundfest, Joseph A., and Pritchard, Adam C.. “Statutes with Multiple Personality Disorders: The Value of Ambiguity in Statutory Design and Interpretation.” Stanford Law Review 54, no. 4 (2002): 627–736.10.2307/1229575CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Gunningham, Neil, and Sinclair, Darren. Leaders and Laggards: Next-Generation Environmental Regulation. New York: Routledge, 2017.10.4324/9781351282000CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Hess, David. “Ethical Infrastructure and Evidence-Based Corporate Compliance and Ethics Programs: Policy Implications from the Empirical Evidence.” New York Journal of Law & Business 12, no. 2 (2016): 317–68.Google Scholar
Holley, Cameron, Gunningham, Neil, and Shearing, Clifford. The New Environmental Governance. New York: Routledge, 2013.10.4324/9781315067278CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Kagan, Robert A. Adversarial Legalism: The American Way of Law. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 2009.10.2307/j.ctvjz83k7CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Krawiec, Kimberly D. “Cosmetic Compliance and the Failure of Negotiated Governance.” Washington University Law Quarterly 81, no. 2 (2003): 487–544.Google Scholar
Krawiec, Kimberly D. “The Return of the Rogue.” Arizona Law Review 51, no. 1 (2009): 127–74.Google Scholar
Krawiec, Kimberly D. “Don’t ‘Screw Joe the Plummer’: The Sausage-Making of Financial Reform.” Arizona Law Review 55, no. 1 (2013): 53–103.Google Scholar
Langevoort, Donald C. “Cultures of Compliance.” American Criminal Law Review 54 (2017): 933–77.Google Scholar
Langevoort, Donald C. “Behavioral Ethics, Behavioral Compliance.” In Research Handbook on Corporate Crime and Financial Misdealing, edited by Arlen, Jennifer, 263–81. Northampton, MA: Edward Elgar Publishing, 2018.10.4337/9781783474479.00020CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Laufer, William S., and Strudler, Alan. “Corporate Crime and Making Amends.” American Criminal Law Review 44, no. 4 (2007): 1307–18.Google Scholar
Lobel, Orly. “The Renew Deal: The Fall of Regulation and the Rise of Governance in Contemporary Legal Thought.” Minnesota Law Review 89 (2004): 342–470.Google Scholar
Magat, Wesley A., and Viscusi, W. Kip. “Effectiveness of the EPA’s Regulatory Enforcement: The Case of Industrial Effluent Standards.” Journal of Law and Economics 33, no. 2 (1990): 331–60.10.1086/467208CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Moosa, Imad. Quantification of Operational Risk under Basel II: the Good, Bad and Ugly. London: Palgrave Macmillan, 2008.10.1057/9780230595149CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Murphy, Michael E. “Assuring Responsible Risk Management in Banking: The Corporate Governance Dimension.” Delaware Journal of Corporate Law 36, no. 1 (2011): 121–64.Google Scholar
Power, Michael. “The Invention of Operational Risk.” Review of International Political Economy 12, no. 4 (2006): 577–99.10.1080/09692290500240271CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Riles, Annelise. Collateral Knowledge: Legal Reasoning in the Global Financial Markets. Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 2011.10.7208/chicago/9780226719344.001.0001CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Sands, Peter, Liao, Gordon, and Ma, Yueran. “Rethinking Operational Risk Capital Requirements.” Journal of Financial Regulation 4, no. 1 (2018): 1–34.10.1093/jfr/fjx009CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Simons, Ernest L. IV “Anti-Money Laundering Compliance: Only Mega Banks Need Apply.” North Carolina Banking Institute Journal 17, no. 1 (2013): 249–74.Google Scholar
Trubek, David M., and Trubek, Louise G.. “Hard and Soft Law in the Construction of Social Europe: The Role of the Open Method of Co-ordination.” European Law Journal 11, no. 3 (2005): 343–64.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
U.S. Food & Drug Administration. Drug Quality Sampling and Testing Programs, https://www.fda.gov/drugs/scienceresearch/ucm407277.htm, 2017.Google Scholar
U.S. Securities & Exchange Commission. The Laws that Govern the Securities Industry, https://www.sec.gov/answers/about-lawsshtml.html, modified 2013.Google Scholar
Wilmarth, Arthur E. Jr. “The Dodd-Frank Act: A Flawed and Inadequate Response to the Too-Big-to-Fail Problem.” Oregon Law Review 89, no. 3 (2010): 951–1057.Google Scholar

STATUTES CITED

Private Securities Litigation Reform Act (PSLRA), Pub. L. 104–67, 109 Stat. 737 (1995).Google Scholar
Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002, Pub. L. 107–204, 116 Stat. 745 (2002).CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Securities Act of 1933, 15 U.S.C. §77a et seq. (1933).Google Scholar