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Game Theory, Procedure, and Consent: Focusing on Fair Division

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  27 December 2018

Arthur L. Stinchcombe
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Abstract

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Type
Review Section Symposium
Information
Law & Social Inquiry , Volume 22 , Issue 4 , Fall 1997 , pp. 1087 - 1105
Copyright
Copyright © American Bar Foundation, 1997 

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References

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