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Preferences for Law?

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  27 December 2018

Frederick Schauer
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Law & Social Inquiry , Volume 42 , Issue 1 , Winter 2017 , pp. 87 - 99
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Copyright © American Bar Foundation, 2017 

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References

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