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The Politics of Imperfection: The Amendment of Constitutions

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  27 December 2018

John Ferejohn
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Abstract

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Type
Review Essay
Information
Law & Social Inquiry , Volume 22 , Issue 2 , Spring 1997 , pp. 501 - 530
Copyright
Copyright © American Bar Foundation, 1997 

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