More than half a century ago, Walton H. Hamilton recognized the dual economic and moral spirit of the nineteenth century's ‘sense of individualism’ when he wrote that the legal maxim caveat emptor ‘served well its two masters, business and justice’. However, recent scholarship has captured only half that spirit. Historians have concentrated on business and attributed the way judges shaped the law of the marketplace to their desire to promote economic growth. James Willard Hurst, in his seminal Law and the Conditions of Freedom in the Nineteenth Century United States, posits ‘the release of individual creative energy’ as the ‘dominant value’ in American law for the first half or three-quarters of the nineteenth century, pointing to such developments as the judicial embellishment of ‘procedures and instruments to promote dealing at a distance and on credit’ in response ‘to the needs of a growing commerce’. Lawrence M. Friedman states that nineteenth century contract law was ‘attuned to the needs of a growing economy, at least as the leading judges read those needs’. Harold M. Hyman and William M. Wiecek credit the content of pre-Civil War contract law to the ‘developmental, entrepreneurial bias’ of antebellum judges. According to Bernard Schwartz, the job of American law, at least through the Civil War, was ‘to furnish the legal tools necessary for effective mobilization of the community's resources’. William E. Nelson, adding a class twist to the ‘developmental’ theme, writes that the law in the nineteenth century ‘came to be a tool by which those interest groups that had emerged victorious in the competition for control of law-making institutions could seize most of society's wealth for themselves and enforce their seizure upon the losers’.