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Response to Review by Barry Levy

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  14 February 2011

Jane E. Calvert*
Affiliation:
Associate Professor of History, University of Kentucky, Director/Editor, The John Dickinson Writings Project, [email protected]
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Abstract

Type
Correspondence
Copyright
Copyright © the American Society for Legal History, Inc. 2011

To the Editor:

Barry Levy's assessment of my book, Quaker Constitutionalism and the Political Thought of John Dickinson, as “blemished” by my “exclusion of key evidence and concepts” is not founded upon a close reading. After not identifying the core thesis, he takes points out of context, sees things that aren't there, ignores things that are, and criticizes the exclusion of peripheral topics.

My thesis distilled is that Quakers were the first to imagine a civil constitution as both perpetual and amendable, and they originated the theory and practice of civil disobedience for peaceful constitutional change. Claiming that my description of Pennsylvania is “an uniformed vision of loveliness,” Levy ignores three chapters that, agreeing with earlier scholarship, find Quaker practice highly problematic. He considers my work negligent for allegedly not discussing political economy, including marriage (?), while missing the discussion of relevant economic behavior—boycotting, civil disobedience (a central theme he doesn't mention), and merchant interests (158, 208–10, 219–24, 331).

Likewise, Levy reveals that he hasn't read carefully any of Dickinson's work when he claims he “continually legitimate[d] violent revolution.” Not once, in any of his writings, public or private, did Dickinson advocate revolution for America. As I make clear—dealing thoroughly with the apparent contradictions in Dickinson's thought—he believed in defensive war (192, 233–35), something quite different from revolution, which should happen only rarely (220). He could support the French Revolution (which is beyond the scope of this study) because the French, unlike the British, didn't have a constitution to protect them.

Leaving aside the numerous other, smaller misrepresentations, I trust careful readers to judge for themselves the merit of my work.