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Reelecting Corrupt Incumbents in Exchange for Public Goods: Rouba mas faz in Brazil

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  05 September 2022

Carlos Pereira  and
Marcus André Melo
Carlos Pereira
Affiliation:
School of Administration (EBAPE), Getúlio Vargas Foundation (FGV), Rio de Janeiro
Marcus André Melo
Affiliation:
Department of Political Science, Federal University of Pernambuco (UFPE)
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Abstract

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This article addresses the paradox of unpopular corruption and popular corrupt politicians. It explores why corrupt politicians are reelected, paying particular attention to incumbent provision of public goods and voter information on incumbent misconduct. Using a new data set on mayoral elections (2000 and 2004) in the Brazilian state of Pernambuco, we specify econometric models to test the hypothesis that incumbents' performance in delivering public goods might mitigate reputational losses. Our main empirical analysis suggests that (1) corruption decreases the probability of incumbent reelection, (2) public expenditure increases the probability of reelection, and (3) the negative marginal effect of corruption on reelection disappears as public expenditure increases.

Resumo

Resumo

Este artigo analisa o paradoxo existente entre a impopularidade da corrupção e a popularidade de políticos corruptos. Particularmente, o artigo investiga por que políticos corruptos são reeleitos, com ênfase por um lado, na provisão de bens públicos, e por outro no acesso à informação dos eleitores sobre o comportamento desviante dos governantes. A partir de um novo banco de dados sobre as eleições para prefeito (2000 e 2004) de todos os municípios do estado brasileiro de Pernambuco, são especificados modelos econométricos para testar a hipótese de que a performance de governantes ofertando bens públicos pode mitigar os efeitos negativos de corrupção. Os principais resultados empíricos sugerem: corrupção diminui a probabilidade de reeleição; maior gasto público aumenta a probabilidade de reeleição; o efeito marginal negativo de corrupção sobre reeleição desaparece quando o gasto público aumenta.

Type
Research Article
Information
Latin American Research Review , Volume 50 , Issue 4 , 2015 , pp. 88 - 115
Copyright
Copyright © 2015 by the Latin American Studies Association

Footnotes

Previous versions of this article were presented at the Twelfth Annual Conference of the International Society for New Institutional Economics, Toronto, 2008, and the Annual Meeting of the American Political Science Association, Boston, 2008. We are grateful to Ravi Bhavnani, Ernesto Calvo, Rafael Goldszmidt, Joana Monteiro, Gregory Michener, Nara Pavão, Renato Lima, Frederico Bertholini, and Diego de Faveri for assistance and support. We thank Brazil's National Council for Scientific and Technological Development (CNPq) for financial support.

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