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Accountability and Corruption in Argentina during the Kirchners' Era

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  05 September 2022

Luigi Manzetti
Luigi Manzetti*
Affiliation:
Centre for the Study of the Americas
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Abstract

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This article highlights an important paradox: in Argentina between 2003 and 2013 the center-left Peronist government's approach to governance mirrors that of the center-right Peronist administration of the 1990s. While the latter centralized authority to pursue neoliberal reforms, the former have centralized authority in the name of expanding government intervention in the economy. In both cases, corruption has tended to go unchecked due to insufficient government accountability. Therefore, although economic policies and political rhetoric have changed dramatically, government corruption remains a constant of the Argentine political system due to the executive branch's ability to emasculate constitutional checks and balances.

Resumen

Resumen

Este artículo pone de relieve una paradoja importante: en la Argentina entre 2003 y 2013 los gobiernos peronistas de centro-izquierda reflejan los de la administración peronista de centro-derecha de la década de 1990. Mientras en los años noventa la concentración del poder presidencial se usó para promover reformas neoliberales, en los 2000 la autoridad centralizada se persiguió en nombre de la expansión de la intervención gubernamental en la economía. En ambos casos, la corrupción ha tendido a pasar inadvertida debido a la insuficiencia de la rendición de cuentas del gobierno. Por lo tanto, aunque las políticas económicas y la retórica política han cambiado drásticamente, la corrupción gubernamental sigue siendo una constante del sistema político argentino, gracias a la capacidad del Poder Ejecutivo para nulificar a los controles y equilibrios constitucionales.

Type
Research Article
Information
Latin American Research Review , Volume 49 , Issue 2 , 2014 , pp. 173 - 195
Copyright
Copyright © 2014 by the Latin American Studies Association

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