This article explores the role of environmental concerns in free trade areas made up entirely of developing countries. It surveys the environmental institutions of Mercosur, the Common Market of South America, and its member states. It also presents a case study of the recently terminated negotiations over a regional environmental legal instrument as an example of collective environmental decisionmaking. The article concludes that all the environmental components of the agreement are weak, and have even been downgraded in recent years. Even so, national environmental protections have increased during the years of the Mercosur agreement, and some regional actors are poised to join their northern counterparts in opposition to any potential free trade area of the Americas that does not include environmental provisions.

In the United States, an important literature shows that legislators use interest groups, courts, and budgets to assert political control over bureaucrats. Similar theories can be applied to study the scores of new democracies that have emerged in recent decades. In Argentina, politicians in the first administration of Carlos Menem (1989-95) rewrote administrative procedures and relied on both “police patrol” and “fire alarm” oversight to realign the behavior of tax bureaucrats in conformance with their own policy preferences. Whereas U.S. legislators generally prefer complex administrative procedures, different electoral incentives led their Argentine counterparts to support reforms that significantly streamlined those procedures. This finding challenges theories that attribute legislators' bureaucratic preferences to the separation or fusion of powers between the executive and legislative branches.

This study examines Mexico's unilateral trade liberalization experience from 1985 to 1988. It traces the origins of policy change to officials in the Central Bank, who took advantage of periodic economic crises to pursue their agenda. Opposing them were bureaucrats tied to an industrial sector that also objected to substantial trade liberalization. Mexico's institutional structures influenced the balance of bargaining power as reform supporters and opponents bitterly fought to define the scope, depth, and timing of the implementation process. Successful implementation led to the emergence of business interests in favor of free trade—interests that would provide crucial backing for the North American Free Trade Agreement.

The process of political transition in Mexico has fostered several institutional transformations in the political system. Such changes do not modify the system's design, but they do reactivate some basic institutions and forgotten powers that affect the operation of the political system as a whole. The state governors have undergone one of the most relevant transformations: they have gained more autonomy and have forged a new relationship with the federal executive. This essay analyzes the different actions governors have taken depending on their partisan origin. While the PAN governors focus on administrative and financial issues, the PRI governors have developed the most important political challenges to the president's authority.