Hostname: page-component-745bb68f8f-kw2vx Total loading time: 0 Render date: 2025-02-05T07:58:58.848Z Has data issue: false hasContentIssue false
  • English
  • Français

Brian Crisp. Democratic Institutional Design: The Powers and Incentives of Venezuelan Politicians and Interest Groups. Stanford: Stanford University Press, 2000. Tables, figures, bibliography, index, 273 pp.; hardcover $55.

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  02 January 2018

Peter Siavelis
Peter Siavelis*
Affiliation:
Wake Forest University
Get access Rights & Permissions [Opens in a new window]

Abstract

An abstract is not available for this content so a preview has been provided. Please use the Get access link above for information on how to access this content.
Image of the first page of this content. For PDF version, please use the ‘Save PDF’ preceeding this image.'
Type
Book Reviews
Information
Latin American Politics and Society , Volume 43 , Issue 1 , Spring 2001 , pp. 164 - 167
Copyright
Copyright © University of Miami 2001

Access options

Get access to the full version of this content by using one of the access options below. (Log in options will check for institutional or personal access. Content may require purchase if you do not have access.)

References

Coppedge, Michael. 1994. Strong Parties and Lame Ducks: Presidential Partyarchy and Factionalism in Venezuela. Stanford: Stanford University Press.Google Scholar
Karl, Terry Lynn. 1997. The Paradox of Plenty: Oil Booms and Petro-States. Berkeley: University of California Press.Google Scholar
Levine, Daniel H. 1978. Venezuela Since 1958: The Consolidation of Democratic Politics. In The Breakdown of Democratic Regimes, ed. Juan, J. Linz and Alfred, Stepan. Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press. 82–109.Google Scholar