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Polarization and Electoral Incentives: The End of the Chilean Consensus Democracy, 1990–2014

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  22 October 2018

Jorge Fábrega ,
Jorge González  and
Jaime Lindh
Jorge Fábrega*
Affiliation:
Associate professor at the Research Center for Social Complexity, School of Government, Universidad del Desarrollo.
Jorge González*
Affiliation:
Assistant professor at the Universidad Adolfo Ibañez.
Jaime Lindh*
Affiliation:
Researcher at the Fundación Piensa.
*
[email protected]
[email protected]
[email protected]
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Abstract

Consensus democracy among the main Chilean political forces ended abruptly after the 2013 presidential and parliamentary elections, the most polarized elections since the return to democracy in 1990. Relying on spatial voting theory to uncover latent ideological dimensions from survey data between 1990 and 2014, this study finds patterns of gradual polarization starting at least ten years before the collapse of consensus, based on an increasing demobilization of the political center that misaligned politicians from their political platforms (particularly in the center-left parties). That phenomenon changed the political support for the two main political coalitions and the intracoalition bargaining power of their various factions. The pattern also helps to explain the process behind the 2015 reform of the electoral system.

Keywords

PolarizationideologyChilean politics
Type
Research Article
Information
Latin American Politics and Society , Volume 60 , Issue 4 , November 2018 , pp. 49 - 68
Copyright
© 2018 University of Miami 

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