We examine whether pronoun interpretation is affected by naturalistic co-speech gesture. Participants in three conditions watched narrations containing ambiguous pronouns. In one condition the narrator produced gestures consistent with order-of-mention; in another, they conflicted with order-of-mention; and in the third, she did not gesture. Results showed that when the gestures conflicted with order-of-mention participants were much less likely to interpret the pronoun as referring to the first-mentioned character. In a second experiment we ruled out the possibility that participants were simply picking up on differences within the speech itself. These results extend previous work on gesture and language processing by showing that the information in gesture can influence the way people interpret words which by their nature are ambiguous, and that this influence is similar to that of well-known speech internal cues.

The present research examines the effects of body-object interaction (BOI) on eye gaze behaviour in a reading task. BOI measures perceptions of the ease with which a human body can physically interact with a word's referent. A set of high BOI words (e.g. cat) and a set of low BOI words (e.g. sun) were selected, matched on imageability and concreteness (as well as other lexical and semantic variables). Facilitatory BOI effects were observed: gaze durations and total fixation durations were shorter for high BOI words, and participants made fewer regressions to high BOI words. The results provide evidence of a BOI effect on non-manual responses and in a situation that taps normal reading processes. We discuss how the results (a) suggest that stored motor information (as measured by BOI ratings) is relevant to lexical semantics, and (b) are consistent with an embodied view of cognition (Wilson 2002).

There exists a fundamental paradox in linguistic cognition. Experiments show consistent sound-symbolic biases in people's processing of artificial words, yet the biases are not manifest in the structure of real words. To address this paradox, we designed an experiment to test the magnitude and source of these biases. Participants were tasked with matching nonsense words to novel object forms. One group was implicitly taught a matching rule congruent with biases reported previously, while a second group was taught a rule incongruent with this bias. In test trials, participants in the congruent condition performed only modestly but significantly better than chance and better than participants in the incongruent condition who performed at chance. These outcomes indicate the processing bias is real but weak and reflects an inherent learning bias. We discuss implications for language learning and transmission, considering the functional value of non-arbitrariness in language structure and underlying neurocognitive mechanisms.