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Logical mechanism design

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  07 February 2011

Iyad Rahwan  and
Kate Larson
Iyad Rahwan*
Affiliation:
Computing & Information Science Program, Masdar Institute of Science & Technology, Abu Dhabi, UAE The Media Lab, Massachusetts Institute of Technology, Cambridge, 02139 MA, USA; e-mail: [email protected]
Kate Larson*
Affiliation:
Cheriton School of Computer Science, University of Waterloo, Waterloo, ON, N2L 3G1, Canada; e-mail: [email protected]
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Abstract

Game theory is becoming central to the design and analysis of computational mechanisms in which multiple entities interact strategically. The tools of mechanism design are used extensively to engineer incentives for truth revelation into resource allocation (e.g. combinatorial auctions) and preference aggregation protocols (e.g. voting). We argue that mechanism design can also be useful in the design of logical inference procedures. In particular, it can help us understand and engineer inference procedures when knowledge is distributed among self-interested agents. We set a research agenda for this emerging area, and point to some early research efforts.

Type
Articles
Information
The Knowledge Engineering Review , Volume 26 , Special Issue 1: 25th Anniversary Issue , 07 February 2011 , pp. 61 - 69
Copyright
Copyright © Cambridge University Press 2011

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