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Two Charges of Intellectualism against Kant

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  04 June 2013

Arthur Melnick
Arthur Melnick*
Affiliation:
University of Illinois Email: [email protected]
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Abstract

The contemporary discussion of non-conceptual content inaugurated by Gareth Evans and John McDowell has generated a range of differing views as to Kant's position on the issues raised. I argue that for Kant perception is prior to thought and that it is as being prior that perception connects us to reality in outer intuition. I then argue that for Kant thought relates to perception by being the rule for perceptual procedures. This accounts for thought's extending in scope beyond what we actually perceive to all that is manifest in space and time. As against Merleau-Ponty this Kantian understanding of thought beyond perception does not distort the nature of reality which remains essentially that which can be engaged.

Keywords

intellectualismKantMerleau-Pontynon-conceptual contentperceptionreality-for-us
Type
Articles
Information
Kantian Review , Volume 18 , Issue 2 , July 2013 , pp. 197 - 219
Copyright
Copyright © Kantian Review 2013 

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