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Reality in-itself and the Ground of Causality

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  20 May 2019

Christian Onof
Christian Onof*
Affiliation:
Birkbeck College, University of London
*
Email: [email protected]
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Abstract

This article presents a metaphysical approach to the interpretation of the role of things-in-themselves in Kant’s theoretical philosophy. This focuses upon identifying their transcendental function as the grounding of appearances. It is interpreted as defining the relation of appearing as the grounding of empirical causality. This leads to a type of dual-aspect account that is given further support through a detailed examination of two sections of Kant’s first Critique. This shows the need to embed this dual-aspect account within a two-perspective framework. The resulting picture is contrasted with the main rival theories and objections are addressed.

Keywords

things-in-themselvesnoumenatranscendental objectaffectioncausality
Type
Articles
Information
Kantian Review , Volume 24 , Issue 2 , June 2019 , pp. 197 - 222
Copyright
© Kantian Review, 2019 

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