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Nicholas Stang’s Kant’s Modal Metaphysics

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  21 August 2018

Kris McDaniel*
Affiliation:
Syracuse University

Abstract

In this critical review, I focus on two things. First, I respond to Stang’s interpretation of Descartes, according to which Descartes’ endorsement of his ontological argument commits him to possibilism, the doctrine that there are, or at least could be, non-existent individuals. My response consists in presenting a version of Descartes’ argument the acceptance of which does not require the acceptance of possibilism. The second thing I focus on is Stang’s claim that Kant distinguishes several kinds of real possibility. I raise worries about Stang’s formulations of various doctrines of real possibility, and I preliminarily explore how real essence and ground are connected with the various kinds of real necessity Stang’s Kant recognizes.

Type
Author Meets Critics
Copyright
© Kantian Review 2018 

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References

Brown, Deborah (2011) ‘Descartes on True and False Ideas’. In Janet Broughton and John Carriero (eds), A Companion to Descartes (Malden, MA: Blackwell Publishing), pp. 196215.Google Scholar
Cunning, David (2014) ‘Descartes’ Modal Metaphysics’. In Edward N. Zalta (ed.), The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy (Spring 2014 edn). URL = http://plato.stanford.edu/archives/spr2014/entries/descartes–modal.Google Scholar
McDaniel, Kris (2017) The Fragmentation of Being. Oxford: Oxford University Press.Google Scholar