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The Nature of the ‘I Think’: Comments on Chapter 11 of Kant's Thinker

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  31 January 2014

Falk Wunderlich*
Affiliation:
Johannes Gutenberg-Universität Mainz Email: [email protected]

Abstract

The article deals with Kant's theory of the self in Patricia Kitcher's Kant's Thinker in three respects: (1) I argue that it is doubtful whether accompanying representations with the ‘I think’ as such yields a principle for the categories since it does not require any strong kind of connection between them. (2) I discuss textual evidence for and against Kitcher's attempt to make sense of Kant's claim that the ‘I think’ requires the continued existence of cognizers per se. (3) I ask whether Kitcher's understanding of Kant's positive theory of the self leans towards minimal substantialism or towards functionalism.

Type
Symposium on Patricia Kitcher's Kant's Thinker
Copyright
Copyright © Kantian Review 2014 

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References

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