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Kant on the Logical Form of Singular Judgements

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  30 September 2014

Huaping Lu-Adler
Huaping Lu-Adler*
Affiliation:
Georgetown University Email: [email protected]
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Abstract

At A71/B96–7 Kant explains that singular judgements are ‘special’ because they stand to the general ones as Einheit to Unendlichkeit. The reference to Einheit brings to mind the category of unity and hence raises a spectre of circularity in Kant’s explanation. I aim to remove this spectre by interpreting the Einheit-Unendlichkeit contrast in light of the logical distinctions among universal, particular and singular judgments shared by Kant and his logician predecessors. This interpretation has a further implication for resolving a controversy over the correlation between the logical moments of quantity (universal, particular, singular) and the categorial ones (unity, plurality, totality).

Keywords

Kantsingular judgementlogical extensionunityinfinity
Type
Articles
Information
Kantian Review , Volume 19 , Issue 3 , November 2014 , pp. 367 - 392
Copyright
© Kantian Review 2014 

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