Hostname: page-component-cd9895bd7-jn8rn Total loading time: 0 Render date: 2024-12-25T13:04:11.494Z Has data issue: false hasContentIssue false

‘How, or Why, do we Come to Think of a World of Things in Themselves?’

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  16 June 2011

Manfred Kuehn
Affiliation:
Boston University

Abstract

The interpretation of Kant's Critical philosophy as a version of traditional idealism has a long history. In spite of Kant's and his commentators’ various attempts to distinguish between traditional and transcendental idealism, his philosophy continues to be construed as committed (whether explicitly or implicitly and whether consistently or inconsistently) to various features usually associated with the traditional idealist project. As a result, most often, the accusation is that his Critical philosophy makes too strong metaphysical and epistemological claims.

In his The Revolutionary Kant, Graham Bird engages in a systematic and thorough evaluation of the traditionalist interpretation, as part of perhaps the most comprehensive and compelling defence of a revolutionary reading of Kant's thought. In the third part of this special issue, the exchanges between, on the one hand, Graham Bird and, on the other, Gary Banham, Gordon Brittan, Manfred Kuehn, Adrian Moore and Kenneth Westphal focus on specific aspects of Bird's interpretation of Kant's first Critique. More exactly, the emphasis is on specific aspects of Bird's interpretation of the Introduction, Analytic of Principles and Transcendental Dialectic of Kant's first Critique.

The second part of the special issue is devoted to discussions of particular topics in Bird's construal of the remaining significant parts of the first Critique, namely, of the Transcendental Aesthetic and the Analytic of Concepts. Written by Sorin Baiasu and Michelle Grier, these articles examine specific issues in these two remaining parts of the Critique, from the perspective of the debate between the traditionalist and revolutionary interpretation. The special issue begins with an Introduction by the guest co-editors. This provides a summary of the exchanges between Bird and his critics, with a particular focus on the debates stemming from the differences between traditional and revolutionary interpretations of Kant.

Type
Critical Exchange
Copyright
Copyright © Kantian Review 2011

Access options

Get access to the full version of this content by using one of the access options below. (Log in options will check for institutional or personal access. Content may require purchase if you do not have access.)

References

Bird, G. (1962) Kant's Theory of Knowledge: An Outline of one Central Argument in the ‘Critique of Pure Reason’. London: Routledge & Kegan Paul.Google Scholar
Bird, G. (2006) The Revolutionary Kant. LaSalle, IL: Open Court.Google Scholar
Hume, D. (1975) Enquiry Concerning Human Understanding. In P. H. Nidditch (ed). Enquiries Concerning Human Understanding and Concerning the Principles of Morals. 3rd edn, Oxford: Oxford University Press.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Kant, I. (1950) Prolegomena to any Future Metaphysics. Tr. L. W. Beck. Indianapolis, IN: Bobbs-Merrill.Google Scholar
Kant, I. (1996) Groundwork of the Metaphysics of Morals. Tr. M. Gregor. In Immanuel Kant, Practical Philosophy. Tr. and ed. M. Gregor. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.Google Scholar
Kant, I. (1997) Critique of Pure Reason. Tr. and ed. P. Guyer. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.Google Scholar