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How is Religious Experience Possible? On the (Quasi-Transcendental) Mode of Argument in Kant’s Religion

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  24 January 2022

Stephen R. Palmquist
Stephen R. Palmquist*
Affiliation:
Independent Researcher, Los Angeles, CA, USA
*
Email: [email protected]
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Abstract

Kant’s general mode of argument in Religion within the Bounds of Bare Reason, especially his defence of human nature’s propensity to evil, is a matter of considerable controversy: while some interpret his argument as strictly a priori, others interpret it as anthropological. In dialogue with Allen Wood’s recent work, I defend my earlier claim that Religion employs a quasi-transcendental mode of argument, focused on the possibility of a specific type of experience, not experience in general. In Religion, Kant portrays religious experience as possible only for beings with a good predisposition and a propensity to evil. Kant’s theory of the archetype and his theory of symbolism illustrate the same mode of argument. Taking Religion as a sequel to the third Critique more than the second, my perspectival interpretation makes room for a robust view of unsociable sociability without the absurd deception of regarding it as the source of human evil.

Keywords

Kant’s theory of religionreligious experiencequasi-transcendental argumentspropensity to evilsymbolismperspectival interpretation
Type
Article
Information
Kantian Review , Volume 27 , Issue 1 , March 2022 , pp. 81 - 89
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Copyright
© The Author(s), 2022. Published by Cambridge University Press on behalf of Kantian Review

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References

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