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Freedom, Knowledge and Affection: Reply to Hogan

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  04 February 2013

Nicholas Stang
Nicholas Stang*
Affiliation:
University of Miami
*
Email: [email protected]
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Abstract

In a recent paper, Desmond Hogan aims to explain how Kant could have consistently held that noumenal affection is not only compatible with noumenal ignorance (the doctrine that we have no knowledge of things in themselves) but also with the claim that experience requires causal affection of human cognitive agents by things in themselves. Hogan's argument includes the premise that human cognitive agents have empirical knowledge of one another's actions. Hogan's argument fails because the premise that we have empirical knowledge of one another's actions is ambiguous. On one reading, the argument is valid but its conclusion trivial. On the other, it is unsound on Kant's own view.

Keywords

affectionfreedomKantknowledge
Type
Articles
Information
Kantian Review , Volume 18 , Issue 1 , March 2013 , pp. 99 - 106
Copyright
Copyright © Kantian Review 2013

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References

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