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Explaining Synthetic A Priori Knowledge: The Achilles Heel of Transcendental Idealism?

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  21 April 2022

Robert Stern
Robert Stern*
Affiliation:
University of Sheffield, UK
*
Email: [email protected]
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Abstract

This article considers an apparent Achilles heel for Kant’s transcendental idealism, concerning his account of how synthetic a priori knowledge is possible. The problem is that while Kant’s distinctive attempt to explain synthetic a priori knowledge lies at the heart of his transcendental idealism, this explanation appears to face a dilemma: either the explanation generates a problematic regress, or the explanation it offers gives us no reason to favour transcendental idealism over transcendental realism. In the article, I consider G. E. Moore’s version of the problem, which I argue has not yet received an adequate response. Instead, I offer a way out of this dilemma by focusing on the normativity rather than the metaphysics of the mind.

Keywords

Immanuel KantG. E. Mooresynthetic a priori knowledgetranscendental idealismtranscendental realismthe Copernican revolutionepistemic norms
Type
Article
Information
Kantian Review , Volume 27 , Issue 3 , September 2022 , pp. 385 - 404
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Copyright
© The Author(s), 2022. Published by Cambridge University Press on behalf of Kantian Review

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