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Equity in Kantian Morality: Unmuting the ‘Divinity Who Cannot Be Heard’

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  21 April 2025

Raul Madden Open the ORCID record for Raul Madden [Opens in a new window]
Raul Madden*
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Queen Mary University of London, London, England
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Email: [email protected]
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Abstract

The concept of equity is indispensable to Kantian morality. This claim is controversial given Kant’s labelling of equity as an unenforceable right and his reputed moral absolutism. A need for equity, however, can be elicited from within his writing. For Kant, human dignity constitutes the basis of duty. Conscience demands conformity with duty. Our duties to positively serve humanity are indeterminate. The need for equity arises, therefore, to guide conscientious deliberations in applying moral principles appropriately toward that end in particular situations. This is especially pronounced when one strives to support the dignity of others consistently with one’s own dignity.

Keywords

equityconsciencedignitymoralitypositive duties
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Kantian Review , First View , pp. 1 - 23
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© The Author(s), 2025. Published by Cambridge University Press on behalf of Kantian Review

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