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Shame and Contempt in Kant's Moral Theory

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  04 June 2013

Krista K. Thomason
Krista K. Thomason*
Affiliation:
Swarthmore College E-mail: [email protected]
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Abstract

Attitudes like shame and contempt seem to be at odds with basic tenets of Kantian moral theory. I argue on the contrary that both attitudes play a central role in Kantian morality. Shame and contempt are attitudes that protect our love of honour, or the esteem we have for ourselves as moral persons. The question arises: how are these attitudes compatible with Kant's claim that all persons deserve respect? I argue that the proper object of shame and contempt is not the humanity within a person, but rather her self-conceit, or the false esteem that competes with love of honour.

Keywords

contemptKantlove of honourshame
Type
Articles
Information
Kantian Review , Volume 18 , Issue 2 , July 2013 , pp. 221 - 240
Copyright
Copyright © Kantian Review 2013 

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