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Kant’s Standpoint Distinction

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  16 May 2018

Markus Kohl
Markus Kohl*
Affiliation:
University of North Carolina, Chapel Hill
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Abstract

I examine what Kant means when he appeals to different standpoints. I argue that Kant seeks to contrast an empirical, anthropocentric standpoint with a normative, more than human standpoint. Against common interpretations, I argue that the normative standpoint is not confined to practical reason, since theoretical reason is concerned with what ought to be as well. Finally, I defend the coherence of Kant’s distinction against important objections.

Keywords

standpointsnormativitypractical and theoretical reason
Type
Articles
Information
Kantian Review , Volume 23 , Issue 2 , June 2018 , pp. 229 - 255
Copyright
© Kantian Review 2018 

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