Hostname: page-component-6587cd75c8-mppm8 Total loading time: 0 Render date: 2025-04-23T13:11:57.199Z Has data issue: false hasContentIssue false

Kant on the ‘Wise Adaptation’ of Our Cognitive Faculties: The Limits of Knowledge and the Possibility of the Highest Good

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  16 December 2024

Dylan Shaul*
Affiliation:
University of California, Riverside, Riverside, CA, USA

Abstract

This article provides a new reconstruction and evaluation of Kant’s argument in §IX of the second Critique’s Dialectic. Kant argues that our cognitive faculties are wisely adapted to our practical vocation since their failure to supply theoretical knowledge of God and the immortal soul is a condition of possibility for the highest good. This new reconstruction improves upon past efforts by greater fidelity to the form and content of Kant’s argument. I show that evaluating Kant’s argument requires settling various other issues in the interpretation of his moral philosophy, e.g. his account of moral psychology, motivation, education, and development.

Type
Article
Copyright
© The Author(s), 2024. Published by Cambridge University Press on behalf of Kantian Review

Access options

Get access to the full version of this content by using one of the access options below. (Log in options will check for institutional or personal access. Content may require purchase if you do not have access.)

Article purchase

Temporarily unavailable

References

Damstra, Conrad (2023) ‘The change of heart, moral character and moral reform’. Kantian Review, 28, 555574.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Kain, Patrick (2005) ‘Interpreting Kant’s theory of divine commands’. Kantian Review, 9, 128149.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Kain, Patrick (2021) ‘The development of Kant’s conception of divine freedom.’ In Look, Brandon C. (ed.), Leibniz and Kant (Oxford: Oxford University Press), 295319.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Kohl, Markus (2015) ‘Kant and “Ought implies can”’. The Philosophical Quarterly, 65, 690710.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Paytas, Tyler (2017) ‘God’s awful majesty before our eyes: Kant’s moral justification for divine hiddenness’. Kantian Review, 22, 133157.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Paytas, Tyler (2019) ‘Of providence and puppet shows: divine hiddenness as Kantian theodicy.Faith and Philosophy, 36, 5680.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Schellenberg, J. L. (1993) Divine Hiddenness and Human Reason. Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press.Google Scholar
Stern, Robert (2004) ‘Does ‘ought imply can’? And did Kant think it does?’. Utilitas, 16, 4261.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Timmermann, Jens (2015) ‘Why some things must remain unknown: Kant on faith, moral motivation, and the highest good’. In Aufderheide, Joachim and Bader, Ralf M. (eds.), The Highest Good in Aristotle and Kant (Oxford: Oxford University Press), 229242.Google Scholar
Van Inwagen, Peter (2002) ‘What is the problem of the hiddenness of God?’. In Howard-Snyder, Daniel and Moser, Paul (eds.), Divine Hiddenness: New Essays (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press), 2432.Google Scholar
Ware, Owen (2015) ‘Accessing the moral law through feeling.Kantian Review, 20, 301311.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Ware, Owen (2021) Kant’s Justification of Ethics. Oxford: Oxford University Press.Google Scholar
Watkins, Eric (2009) ‘Kant on the hiddenness of God.Kantian Review, 14, 81122.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Watkins, Eric (2010a) ‘Kant on the hiddenness of God’. In Bruxvoort Lipscomb, Benjamin J. and Krueger, James (eds.), Kant’s Moral Metaphysics: God, Freedom, and Immortality (Berlin and New York: de Gruyter), 255290.Google Scholar
Watkins, Eric (2010b) ‘The antinomy of practical reason: reason, the unconditioned, and the highest good’. In Reath, Andrews and Timmermann, Jens (eds.), Kant’s Critique of Practical Reason: A Critical Guide (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press), 145167.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Weidner, Veronika (2021) Divine Hiddenness. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.Google Scholar