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Kant on Radical Evil and the Origin of Moral Responsibility

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  04 February 2013

Irene McMullin
Irene McMullin*
Affiliation:
University of Arkansas
*
Email: [email protected]
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Abstract

The notion of radical evil plays a more important role in Kant's moral theory than is typically recognized. In Religion Within the Limits of Mere Reason, radical evil is both an innate propensity and a morally imputable act – a paradoxical status that has prompted commentators to reject it as inconsistent with the rest of Kant's moral theory. In contrast, I argue that the notion of radical evil accounts for the beginning of moral responsibility in Kant's theory, since the act of attributing radical evil to one's freedom is an inauguration into the autonomous stance.

Keywords

autonomyobligationincentiveinnate propensityintelligible actmaximmoral lawradical evilrespectresponsibility
Type
Articles
Information
Kantian Review , Volume 18 , Issue 1 , March 2013 , pp. 49 - 72
Copyright
Copyright © Kantian Review 2013

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