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Kant on Perception, Experience and Judgements Thereof

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  24 August 2017

Banafsheh Beizaei
Banafsheh Beizaei*
Affiliation:
New York University
*
Email: [email protected]
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Abstract

It is commonly thought that the distinction between subjectively valid judgements of perception and objectively valid judgements of experience in the Prolegomena is not consistent with the account of judgement Kant offers in the B Deduction, according to which a judgement is ‘nothing other than the way to bring given cognitions to the objective unity of apperception’. Contrary to this view, I argue that the Prolegomena distinction maps closely onto that drawn between the mathematical and dynamical principles in the System of Principles: Kant’s account of the Prolegomena distinction strongly suggests that it is the Analogies of Experience that make it possible for judgements of perception to give rise to judgements of experience. This means that judgements of perception are objectively valid with regard to the quantity and quality of objects, and subjectively valid with regard to the relation they posit between objects. If that is the case, then the notion of a judgement of perception is consistent with the B Deduction account of judgement.

Keywords

perceptionexperiencejudgementobjectivityappearancejudgement of perceptionjudgement of experienceSystem of PrinciplesProlegomena
Type
Articles
Information
Kantian Review , Volume 22 , Issue 3 , September 2017 , pp. 347 - 371
Copyright
© Kantian Review 2017 

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