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Is Kant's Transcendental Deduction of the Categories Fit for Purpose?

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  03 June 2011

Anil Gomes
Anil Gomes
Affiliation:
Birkbeck College, London
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Extract

James Van Cleve has argued that Kant's transcendental deduction of the categories shows, at most, that we must apply the categories to experience. This falls short of Kant's aim, which is to show that they must so apply. In this discussion I argue that, once we have noted the differences between the first and second editions of the deduction, this objection is less telling. But Van Cleve's objection can help illuminate the structure of the B deduction, and it suggests an interesting reason why the rewriting might have been thought necessary.

Type
Articles
Information
Kantian Review , Volume 15 , Issue 2 , July 2010 , pp. 118 - 137
Copyright
Copyright © Kantian Review 2010

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