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Comment on Jens Timmermann, ‘Autonomy, Progress and Virtue: Why Kant Has Nothing to Fear from the Overdemandingness Objection’

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  21 August 2018

John Skorupski
John Skorupski*
Affiliation:
University of St Andrews
*
Email: [email protected]
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Abstract

Jens Timmermann’s scholarship illuminates the nuances and contexts of Kant’s thought. I have learned a great deal from reading his article. His question is whether Kant’s ethics is overdemanding, in something like the way that ‘classical utilitarianism’ has been thought to be. He is aware that this is not a clear-cut question, however he is inclined to reply that the answer is ‘no’. I too think the question is not clear-cut, but I am inclined to answer ‘yes’.

Type
Critical Exchange
Information
Kantian Review , Volume 23 , Issue 3 , September 2018 , pp. 399 - 405
Copyright
© Kantian Review 2018 

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References

Kant, Immanuel (1996) Practical Philosophy. Trans. Mary J. Gregor. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.Google Scholar
Mill, John Stuart (1963) Collected Works of John Stuart Mill. Ed. J. M. Robson. Toronto: University of Toronto Press.Google Scholar