People often base judgments on stereotypes, even when contradictory base-rate information is provided. In a sample of 438 students from two state universities, we tested several hypotheses regarding why people would prefer stereotype information over base-rates when making judgments: A) People believe stereotype information is more diagnostic than base-rate information, B) people find stereotype information more salient than base-rate information, or C) even though people have some intuitive access to base-rate information, they may need to engage in deliberation before they can make full use of it, and often fail to do so. In line with the deliberative failure account, and counter to the diagnosticity account, we found that inducing deliberation by having people evaluate statements supporting the use of base-rates increased the use of base-rate information. Moreover, counter to the salience and diagnosticity accounts, asking people to evaluate statements supporting the use of stereotypes decreased reliance on stereotype information. Additionally, more numerate subjects were more likely to make use of base-rate information.

The mathematics of downside financial risk can be difficult to understand: For example a 50% loss requires a subsequent 100% gain to break-even. A given percentage loss always requires a greater percentage gain to break-even. Instead, many non-expert investors may assume for example that a 50% gain is sufficient to offset a 50% loss. Over 3,498 participants and five experiments, the widespread illusion that a sequence of equal percentage gains and losses produces a zero overall return was demonstrated. Participants continued to err frequently, even with percentage returns of +/-100%, or when financially incentivized. Financial literacy, numeracy, and deliberation were all shown to independently contribute to accurate performance. These results have implications for promoting the understanding of downside financial risk.

We focus on the everyday decision making challenges faced by high functioning adults across the Autism Spectrum using both between- and within-group comparisons. We used Mturk, backed by a combination of recruiting and screening procedures, to recruit large samples using an online survey. The main differences between groups were: greater relationship problems at home, school and work for the ASD group compared to the control group; greater difficulty in a variety of everyday decisions and the negative consequences of their decisions; greater aversion to social risks; lower levels of Rational Ability; and greater personal endorsement of socially undesirable acts. Poorer decision outcomes within the ASD group were predicted by lower levels of Rational Ability and higher personal endorsement of socially undesirable acts. Some of the same predictor-outcome relations were found within the Control group. These results illustrate how the study of unique groups can increase our overall understanding of individual differences in decision making within the general population, and the need to include both between-group and within-group analyses.

Building on Herbert Simon’s critique of rational choice theory, Schwartz et al. (2002) proposed that when making choices, some individuals — maximizers — search extensively through many alternatives with the goal of making the best choice, whereas others — satisficers — search only until they identify an option that meets their standards, which they then choose. They developed the Maximization Scale (MS) to measure individual differences in maximization, and a substantial amount of research has now examined maximization using the MS, painting a picture of maximizers that is generally negative. Recently, however, several researchers have criticized the MS, and almost a dozen new measures of maximization have now been published, resulting in a befuddling and contradictory literature. We seek to clarify the confusing literature on the measurement of maximization to help make sense of the existing findings and to facilitate future research. We begin by briefly summarizing the understanding of maximizers that has emerged through research using Schwartz et al.’s MS. We then review the literature on the measurement of maximization, attempting to identify the similarities and differences among the 11 published measures of maximization. Next, we propose a two-component model of maximization, outlining our view of how maximization should be conceptualized and measured. Our model posits that maximization is best understood as the pursuit of the maximization goal of choosing the best option through the maximization strategy of alternative search; other constructs such as decision difficulty and regret are best considered outcomes or causes — rather than components — of maximization. We discuss the implications of our review and model for research on maximization, highlighting what we see as pressing unanswered questions and important directions for future investigations.

A strategy activated in one task may be transferred to subsequent tasks and prevent activation of other strategies that would otherwise come to mind, a mechanism referred to as procedural priming. In a novel application of procedural priming we show that it can make or break cognitive illusions. Our test case is the 1/k illusion, which is based on the same unwarranted mathematical shortcut as the MPG illusion and the time-saving bias. The task is to estimate distances between values of fractions on the form 1/k. Most people given this task intuitively base their estimates on the distances between the denominators (i.e., the reciprocals of the fractions), which may yield very poor estimations of the true distances between the fractions. As expected, the tendency to fall for this illusion is related to cognitive style (Study 1). In order to apply procedural priming we constructed versions of the task in which the illusion is weak, in the sense that most people do not fall for it anymore. We then gave participants both “strong illusion” and “weak illusion” versions of the task (Studies 2 and 3). Participants who first did the task in the weak illusion version would often persist with the correct strategy even in the strong illusion version, thus breaking the otherwise strong illusion in the latter task. Conversely, participants who took the strong illusion version first would then often fall for the illusion even in the weak illusion version, thus strengthening the otherwise weak illusion in the latter task.

In recent years, many governments have shown a keen interest in “nudges” — approaches to law and policy that maintain freedom of choice, but that steer people in certain directions. Yet to date, there has been little evidence on whether citizens of various societies support nudges and nudging. We report the results of nationally representative surveys in six European nations: Denmark, France, Germany, Hungary, Italy, and the United Kingdom. We find strong majority support for nudges of the sort that have been adopted, or under serious consideration, in democratic nations. Despite the general European consensus, we find markedly lower levels of support for nudges in two nations: Hungary and Denmark. We are not, in general, able to connect support for nudges with distinct party affiliations.

Two experiments explored how the context of recently experiencing an abundance of positive or negative outcomes within a series of choices influences risk preferences. In each experiment, choices were made between a series of pairs of hypothetical 50/50 two-outcome gambles. Participants experienced a control set of mixed outcome gamble pairs intermingled with a randomly assigned set of (a) all-gain, (b) all-loss, or (c) a mixture of all-gain and all-loss gamble pairs. In both experiments, a positive experience led to reduced risk taking in the control set and a negative experience led to increased risk taking. These patterns persisted even after the all-gain and all-loss gamble pairs were no longer present. In addition, we showed that the good luck attributed to positive experiences was associated with decreased, rather than increased, risk taking. These results ran counter to the house money effect, and could not readily be accounted for by changes in assets. We suggest that the goals associated with the predominant valence are likely to be assimilated and applied to other choices within a given situation. We also discuss the need to learn more about the characteristics of choice bracketing and mental accounting that influence which aspects of situational context will be included or excluded from consideration when making each choice.

In six studies, we find evidence for an upward mobility bias, or a tendency to predict that a rise in ranking is more likely than a decline, even in domains where motivation or intention to rise play no role. Although people cannot willfully change their height (Study 1), and geographical entities cannot willfully alter their temperature (Study 2), number of natural disasters (Study 3), levels of precipitation (Studies 4A and 4B), or chemical concentration (Study 5), subjects believed that each is more likely to rise than drop in ranking. This bias is due to an association between a ranking’s order and the direction of absolute change, and to the tendency to give considerable weight to a focal agent over non-focal agents. Because people generally expect change to be represented in terms of higher ranks, and because they tend to focus on specific, focal targets, they believe that any given target will experience a larger relative increase than other targets. We discuss implications for social policy.

People frequently underestimate the time needed to complete tasks and we examined a strategy – known as backward planning – that may counteract this optimistic bias. Backward planning involves starting a plan at the end goal and then working through required steps in reverse-chronological order, and is commonly advocated by practitioners as a tool for developing realistic plans and projections. We conducted four experiments to test effects on completion time predictions and related cognitive processes. Participants planned for a task in one of three directions (backward, forward, or unspecified) and predicted when it would be finished. As hypothesized, predicted completion times were longer (Studies 1–4) and thus less biased (Study 4) in the backward condition than in the forward and unspecified conditions. Process measures suggested that backward planning may increase attention to situational factors that delay progress (e.g., obstacles, interruptions, competing demands), elicit novel planning insights, and alter the conceptualization of time.

We investigated whether the personal importance of objects influences utilitarian decision-making in which damaging property is necessary to produce an overall positive outcome. In Experiment 1, participants judged saving five objects by destroying a sixth object to be less acceptable when the action required destroying the sixth object directly (rather than as a side-effect) and the objects were personally important (rather than unimportant). In Experiment 2, we demonstrated that utilitarian judgments were not influenced by the objects’ monetary worth. Together these findings suggest that personal importance underlies people’s sensitivity to damaging property as a means for utilitarian gains.

In this research, we explore how experience with an "attraction set" of options, designed to elicit an asymmetric-dominance (attraction) effect, affects choice making in a second "compromise set" designed to elicit a compromise effect. In Experiment 1, when a compromise set was presented, subjects who had chosen an asymmetrically dominating option from an attraction set were less likely to surrender to the compromise heuristic than their counterparts who had chosen the equivalent option from a binary set. Lower susceptibility to the compromise heuristic suggests that asymmetric dominance might have facilitated the learning of attribute preferences. In Experiment 2, subjects were asked to make six choices in the personal computer category. Subjects who had chosen any number of asymmetrically dominating options from the attraction condition were less susceptible to the compromise heuristic in a subsequent choice task than their counterparts who had chosen the same number of equivalent options from the binary condition. It was unlikely that the effect was caused by better memory of asymmetrically dominating options subjects had previously chosen. Results from the two experiments corroborated the reasoning that asymmetric dominance affects the learning of attribute weights and this effect persists in a subsequent choice task.

We conducted three studies to examine the relationship between spicy tastes and risk seeking. In Study 1, results from a personality judgment task indicated that people were more inclined to attribute a higher level of risk seeking to individuals who enjoy spicy foods. The second study examined whether people who like spicy foods are actually more risk seeking. In fact, people who reported a preference for spicy tastes scored higher on risk taking, as assessed via the Domain-Specific Risk-Taking Scale (Chinese version). Finally, Study 3 employed an experimental design to manipulate risk-seeking tendencies by having participants experience spicy food tastes in the lab. Momentarily savoring spicy foods increased participants’ risk taking in the Iowa Gambling Task. The present findings suggest that preferences for spicy tastes could relate to risk-seeking tendencies and subsequent risk-seeking behaviors.

Consumers make trade-offs when they choose between utilitarian and hedonic products. The former is practical, instrumental, and functional, whereas the latter is sensational and experiential. Prior research shows that people feel more guilt when they contemplate on engaging in hedonic consumption than engaging in utilitarian consumption. The current research investigates the effect of decision targets (i.e., making decisions for oneself or another person) on preferences for utilitarian and hedonic products. Consumers deciding for others were more likely to choose hedonic over utilitarian options than were consumers deciding for themselves. Utilitarian/hedonic was manipulated either through attributes of similar products (Study 1) or through different products (Study 2). Anticipatory guilt accounted for such self–other difference (Study 2). In particular, anticipatory guilt triggered by contemplating hedonic consumption is less for consumers who made choices for others than for those who made choices for themselves. In sum, preferences for utilitarian and hedonic products depend on decision targets.

People typically overestimate how much others are prepared to pay for consumer goods and services. We investigated the extent to which latent beliefs about others’ affluence contribute to this overestimation. In Studies 1, 2a, and 2b we found that participants, on average, judge the other people taking part in the study to “have more money” and “have more disposable income” than themselves. The extent of these beliefs positively correlated with the overestimation of willingness to pay (WTP). Study 3 shows that the link between income-beliefs and WTP is causal, and Studies 4, 5a, and 5b show that it holds in a between-group design with a real financial transaction and is unaffected by accuracy incentives. Study 6 examines estimates of others’ income in more detail and, in conjunction with the earlier studies, indicates that participants’ reported beliefs about others’ affluence depend upon the framing of the question. Together, the data indicate that individual differences in the overestimation effect are partly due to differing affluence-beliefs, and that an overall affluence-estimation bias may contribute to the net tendency to overestimate other people’s willingness to pay.

Contagion refers to the belief that individuals or objects can acquire the essence of a particular source, such as a disgusting product or an immoral person, through physical contact. This paper documents beliefs in a "contact-free" form of contagion whereby an object is thought to inherit the essence of a person when it was designed, but never actually physically touched, by the individual. We refer to this phenomenon as contagion through creative intent or “intention-based contagion” and distinguish it from more traditional forms of contact-based contagion (Studies 1 and 2), as well as alternative mechanisms such as mere association (Studies 2 and 3a). We demonstrate that, like contact-based contagion, intention-based contagion results from beliefs in transferred essence (Study 1) and involves beliefs in transfer of actual properties (Study 4). However, unlike contact-based contagion, intention-based contagion does not appear to be as strongly related to the emotion of disgust (Study 1) and can influence evaluations in auditory as well as visual modalities (Studies 3a–3c).

We propose that in strategic interactions a player is influenced by self-similarity. Self-similarity means that a player who chooses some action X tends to believe, to a greater extent than a player who chooses a different action, that other players will also choose action X. To demonstrate this phenomenon, we analyze the actions and the reported beliefs of players in a two-player two-action symmetric game. The game has the feature that for “materialistic” players, who wish to maximize their own payoff, there should be negative correlation between players’ actions and the beliefs that they assign to their opponent choosing the same action. We first elicit participants’ preferences over the outcomes of the game, and identify a large group of materialistic players. We then ask participants to choose an action in the game and report their beliefs. The reported beliefs of materialistic players are positively correlated with their actions, i.e., they are more likely to choose an action the stronger is their belief that their opponent will also choose the same action. We view this pattern as evidence for the presence of self-similarity.

Proportion responding (PR) is the preference for proportionally higher gains, such that the same absolute quantity is valued more as the reference group decreases. This research investigated this kind of proportion PR in decisions about saving lives (e.g., saving 10/10 lives is preferred to saving 10/100 lives). The results of two studies suggest that PR does not stem from an overall tendency to choose higher proportions, but rather from faulty deliberative reasoning. In particular, people who display PR are less likely to engage in deliberative reflection as measured by response time, the Process Dissociation Procedure, the Cognitive Reflection Test, a numeracy test, and a task assessing denominator neglect. This association between faulty deliberation and PR was observed only when choosing the highest proportion was non-normative because it came at the expense of absolute gains (e.g., saving 10/10 lives is preferred to saving 11/100 lives). These results help to make sense of discrepant findings in previous research, pertaining to how PR relates to biased reasoning and decision making.

In lottery gambling, the common phenomenon of risk aversion shows up as preference of the option with the higher win probability, even if a riskier alternative offers a greater expected value. Because riskier choices would optimize profitability in such cases, the present study investigates the visual format, with which lotteries are conveyed, as potential instrument to modulate risk attitudes. Previous research has shown that enhanced attention to graphical compared to numerical probabilities can increase risk aversion, but evidence for the reverse effect — reduced risk aversion through a graphical display of outcomes — is sparse. We conducted three experiments, in which participants repeatedly selected one of two lotteries. Probabilities and outcomes were either presented numerically or in a graphical format that consisted of pie charts (Experiment 1) or icon arrays (Experiment 2 and 3). Further, expected values were either higher in the safer or in the riskier lottery, or they did not differ between the options. Despite a marked risk aversion in all experiments, our results show that presenting outcomes as graphs can reduce — albeit not eliminate — risk aversion (Experiment 3). Yet, not all formats prove suitable, and non-intuitive outcome graphs can even enhance risk aversion (Experiment 1). Joint analyses of choice proportions and response times (RTs) further uncovered that risk aversion leads to safe choices particularly in fast decisions. This pattern is expressed under graphical probabilities, whereas graphical outcomes can weaken the rapid dominance of risk aversion and the variability over RTs (Experiment 1 and 2). Together, our findings demonstrate the relevance of information format for risky decisions.

Anchoring effects are robust, varied and can be consequential. Researchers have provided a variety of alternative explanations for these effects. More recently, it has become apparent that anchoring effects might be produced by a variety of different processes, either acting simultaneously, or else individually in distinct situations. An unresolved issue is whether anchoring, aside from simple numeric priming, can transcend scales. That is, is it necessary that the anchor value and the target judgment are expressed in the same units? Despite some theoretical predictions to the contrary, this paper demonstrates semantic cross-scale anchoring in four experiments. Such effects are important for the direction of future theorising on the causes of anchoring effects and understanding the scope of their consequences in applied domains.

Failures to reduce greenhouse gas emissions by adopting policies, technologies, and lifestyle changes have led the world to the brink of crisis, or likely beyond. Here we use Internet surveys to attempt to understand these failures by studying factors that affect the adoption of personal energy conservation behaviors and also endorsement of energy conservation goals proposed for others. We demonstrate an asymmetry between goals for self and others (“I’ll do the easy thing, you do the hard thing”), but we show that this asymmetry is partly produced by actor/observer differences: people know what they do already (and generally do not propose those actions as personal goals) and also know their own situational constraints that are barriers to action. We also show, however, that endorsement of conservation goals decreases steeply as a function of perceived difficulty; this suggests a role for motivated cognition as a barrier to conservation: difficult things are perceived as less applicable to one’s situation.